An Economic History of Fertility in the U.S.: 1826-1960 by Larry E. Jones & Michele Tertilt
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We would like to thank Ran Abramitzky, George Alter, Maristella Botticini, Gregory Clark, Lisa Cook,
Marianne Hinds, Ellen McGrattan, and Petra Moser for helpful comments. We would also like to thank
seminar participants at Stanford University and Northwestern University for their comments. Several
research assistants have helped with this project at different stages: Alice Schoonbroodt, Todd Schoellman,
Soohyung Lee, Alejandrina Salcedo-Cisneros, and Adrienne Lin. Financial support from NSF grants
No. 0519324 and 0452473 is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are ours.  The views expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
© 2006 by Larry E. Jones and Michele Tertilt. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.An Economic History of Fertility in the U.S.: 1826-1960
Larry E. Jones and Michele Tertilt




In this paper, we use data from the US census to document the history of the relationship between
fertility choice and key economic indicators at the individual level for women born between 1826
and 1960. We find that this data suggests several new facts that should be useful for researchers trying
to model fertility. (1) The reduction in fertility known as the Demographic Transition (or the Fertility
Transition) seems to be much sharper based on cohort fertility measures compared to usual measures
like Total Fertility Rate; (2) The baby boom was not quite as large as is suggested by some previous
work; (3) We find a strong negative relationship between income and fertility for all cohorts and estimate
an overall income elasticity of about -0.38 for the period; (4) We also find systematic deviations from
a time invariant, isoelastic, relationship between income and fertility. The most interesting of these
is an increase in the income elasticity of demand for children for the 1876-1880 to 1906-1910 birth
















If children were a normal good, one would expect richer people to have more children
than poorer people. This was precisely the concern expressed by Malthus (1798) who
argued that economic growth would lead people to reproduce at a faster rate, and hence
food supply per capita would eventually decline. However, while plausible theoretically,
empirically it is hard to ¯nd such a positive link. On a country level, most countries have
experienced a decline in fertility while incomes were rapidly growing. Cross-country data
also show a clear negative link between GDP and fertility. In this paper, we take a closer
look at this relationship in micro data from the United States. Using census data from nine
di®erent censuses we analyze the time series and cross-section dimension simultaneously.
We explore the exact nature of the relationship between income and fertility for ¯ve-year
birth cohorts of women between 1826-30 and 1956-60 and ¯nd that it is negative for each
cohort. We document how `steep' this relationship is, and ¯nd that overall it has been
fairly stable. We also conduct several accounting exercises and ¯nd that in an accounting
sense, increasing incomes can explain up to 90% of the decline in fertility over this time
horizon. We also identify systematic deviations from a stable, time-invariant relationship
between income and fertility. For example, fertility di®erentials across income levels ¯rst
widened and then compressed signi¯cantly: fertility was more sensitive to income for
women born between 1875 and 1915 { a period covering both the Fertility Transition and
the Baby Bust of the 1930s { than either before or after.
Facts such as these are just some of the examples of demographic changes that have
been seen in the US and in other developed countries over the last 200 years that pose
a challenge to modern researchers to explain and understand. Other examples include
changes in the incidence and timing of marriage, the increase in female labor supply,
changes in the care of parents in old age, an increasing divorce rate, changes in the tim-
ing of births, and large increases in the investment in children through education for
example. Traditionally, attempts at understanding the causes of these changes and their
interrelationships have been conducted in Sociology, History and Demography. They have
increasingly become targets for researchers using the standard techniques of Economics,
however. Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973), Schultz (1973) and Willis (1973) are
early examples with static models while Barro and Becker (1989), Becker and Barro
(1988), Galor and Weil (1996, 2000), Alvarez (1999), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), Green-
wood and Seshadri (2002), Boldrin and Jones (2002), De la Croix and Doepke (2003),
Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003), Doekpke (2004), Greenwood, Seshadri, and
2Yorukoglu (2004), Boldrin, DeNardi and Jones (2005), Doepke (2005), Falcao and Soares
(2005), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), Tertilt (2005), and Boldrin,
Jones, and Schoonbroodt (2006) and are examples of more recent, explicitly dynamic
analyses. This is quite natural in that many of these decisions are intrinsically dynamic
and hence, the development over the last 25 years of the techniques of modern capital
theory are particularly useful in understanding the trends seen.
With this recent theoretical literature in mind, our approach is based on trying to
identify and present facts that will be useful in the challenge of modelling fertility decisions
using economic techniques. Thus, we will, whenever possible, use variables that are closely
linked to individual decisions of optimizing households given the information that they
have. Our ability to do this is restricted, as always, by limitations in the data. For
example, only fertility outcomes are available, not planned fertility. Similarly, for most
years, only gross fertility is available not surviving fertility (i.e., net of infant and child
mortality). Despite these limitations, the data are of considerable interest.
Beginning in 1900 the U.S. Census contains a question asking women how many chil-
dren they had over their life - Children Ever Born (CEB).1 This data was collected until
1990 with the exception of 1920 and 1930. Since the 1900 census data has information
on the age of a woman, we can use this data to go back to the 1826 birth cohort (by
focusing on 74 year old women) to form a long time series of estimated fertility for sur-
viving women. Since the Census data is individual record data, it also contains detailed
information on the characteristics of women, their husbands, and other family members
that are of use in disentangling fertility patterns over the last 150 years. In particular, the
Census contains data on occupation, education, race, and geography. Using Occupation
and Education as proxies for income or wealth,2 we construct a cross-section of the rela-
tionship between wealth and fertility for ¯ve-year birth cohorts beginning with 1826-30
and ending in 1956-60.3 This allows us both to identify separately the cross-sectional and
1All data presented in this paper is based on a 1% sample of the U.S. Census data, made publicly
available at www.ipums.org by Ruggles et. al. (2004). Our analysis is based on data from the IPUMS
webpage available as of 10/20/2004. This data set is updated regularly, the revision history, is available
at: http://www.ipums.org/usa/revisions.html
2Indeed, these may be better measures of the relevant variables determining decisions than, for exam-
ple, income in a single year.
3Our analysis is based on women born between 1826 and 1960, grouped together in cohorts spanning
¯ve birth years each. Data for earlier birth cohorts is also available from the 1900 Census, but since it
requires information from women that are in their 80's, sample sizes are correspondingly smaller. Hence,
we focus on the period since the 1826 to 1830 birth cohort, which we identify with the mid-point of the
period and call the 1828 cohort.
3time series properties of the relationship between income and fertility and, as a result,
document how the time series of fertility has di®ered for women in di®erent parts of the
income distribution.
Some of the facts we describe in this paper are commonly known: the overall decline
in fertility and the baby bust and boom of the 1930s through 1960s. To paint a complete
picture of the U.S. fertility experience, we include a description of these well-known facts
in addition to the many novel insights based on the long time series of cross-sectional
fertility data that are provided.
Much of the focus of the paper is on the relationship between measures of wealth and
fertility. Our main ¯ndings regarding the relationship between fertility and occupational
income (OI) { a proxy for life time income { are as follows.4
First, we ¯nd a strong negative relationship between OI and fertility for each cross-
section. Our estimate of the overall income elasticity of fertility is -0.38. Evaluated at the
mean income for the entire time period, $15,000, this means that a doubling of income
implies a fertility fall from 3.2 to 2.5 children per woman.
Second, we ¯nd that the observed fertility pattern is surprisingly consistent with the
hypothesis that all of the observed fertility decline is the result of a single stable rela-
tionship between income and fertility in conjunction with an outward shift in the income
distribution over time. We ¯t an iso-elastic regression between OI by decile of the pop-
ulation and average CEB within that decile for each birth cohort. Using the estimate
obtained in this way, we can decompose the observed changes in fertility into movements
along the curve due to the growth of income over time and shifts of the curve itself.
Between the 1828 birth cohort and the 1958 one, average income increased by a factor
of about 13, and our estimated elasticity of fertility is -0.38. Thus, one would expect
fertility to fall by 63%, from 5.6 to 2.1 children, whereas the actual fall was to 1.8. Hence,
in this sense, 94% of the observed drop in fertility would have been predicted based on
the relationship between income and fertility ¯tted from the 1828 birth cohort.5
Third, we document systematic deviations from such a stable relationship. These
include a pattern of fertility that is too low for women born during the 1875 to 1910
period and too high for women born between 1925 and 1940. Not only did the level of
the relationship between fertility and income change, but also its slope. We ¯nd that the
income elasticity of children changed signi¯cantly over time, rising from about -0.33 in
4We postpone the precise de¯nition of OI until Section 4.
5Of course the results of this calculation depend on which cohorts are used. We give more details in
Section 4.
4the early years up to a peak of about -0.50 for cohorts born in the late 1800's and down to
about -0.20 in more recent times. We document that the initial widening of fertility across
income groups is related to a di®erence in timing of the fertility transition: The fertility
decline between the 1828 and 1898 birth cohorts started early and was very gradual for
the upper part of the income distribution, while it began later and was very fast for the
lower part of the income distribution.6 The compression during the twentieth century, on
the other hand, was due to a di®erence in magnitudes of the baby bust and boom: The
baby bust was largest in magnitudes for people at the bottom of the income distribution,
while the baby boom was most pronounced for the upper tail of the income distribution,
leading to a convergence in fertility across the income distribution.
We conduct several other analyses to put these results into a broader perspective and
check for their robustness:
² For the early part of the period that we study, some information on surviving chil-
dren is available.7 Using this, we can check to see if our ¯ndings are robust to
possible income related infant and child mortality di®erences. We ¯nd that the re-
lationship between income and surviving fertility is almost identical to that between
income and births;
² We also ¯nd a strong negative relationship between years of schooling of the husband
and fertility. Moreover, this relationship seems to have a fairly stable `slope,' at least
in the data available from the Census. Even when controlling for wife's education
(and also including an interaction term), we ¯nd that an additional year of husband's
education decreases fertility on average by a tenth of a child;
² We document the cross-sectional and time series pattern of fertility with respect to
education, race, immigration status, and geography. For each of these dimensions
of heterogeneity, we ask how much of the overall fertility decline can be accounted
for by the observed change in the distribution of these characteristics.
We believe that the facts we document are of particular interest for several reasons.
1. We ¯nd an extremely robust negative relationship between fertility and income
for 27 cohorts of women. This is contrary to what some authors have suggested
6This mirrors very closely the di®erences in the patterns of the time series of fertility between rural
and urban areas. See Sections 4 and 5 for more discussion.
7In both the 1900 and 1910 censuses data on both children born and children surviving were collected.
5that early on in the development process fertility and wealth used to be positively
related (e.g. Wrigley (1988)). Rather, we ¯nd that even in the mid-1800's wealth
and fertility had a negative relationship.
2. Since this negative relationship between fertility and wealth goes back so far in
time, we think it should give one pause when considering the hypothesis that the
reason for lower fertility at the upper end of the income distribution is the higher
value of the mother's time (e.g. Mo±tt (1984) and Schultz (1985)). That is, this
relationship was present in the data during a period in which most women did not
work in the market at all { married female labor force participation before 1920 was
less than 5% (Schoonbroodt 2003). Hence, the emphasis on the distinction between
male and female earnings seems irrelevant here.
3. Since our measure of lifetime income is based on husband's income only, we argue
that higher income of men is an important predictor for lower fertility. Moreover,
using education as a measure of income, we ¯nd that controlling for wife's education,
the husband's education is strongly negatively related to fertility. This is contrary to
some authors who ¯nd a negative relationship between women's income and fertility,
but a weakly positive (or insigni¯cant) relationship between husband's income and
fertility (e.g. Fleischer and Rhodes (1979), Hotz and Miller (1988), Borg (1989),
Heckman and Walker (1990)).8
A natural question of causation arises with respect to this exercise. Is it technological
improvements and the resultant income growth that caused fertility to change? Or, is it
something else that caused the reduction in fertility and at the same time made techno-
logical innovation and human capital formation more pro¯table? We have no de¯nitive
answer to these questions. Thus, although we will be looking at patterns of correlations
between CEB and various other variables, it is important to remember that these are only
correlations.
The main focus of this paper is how fertility relates to wealth or income. We describe
the existing literature on this topic in Section 2. In Section 3, we lay out the basic time
series pattern of fertility in the US over the last 150 years and discuss how the data from
the census gives new insights to even these data. In Section 4, we describe the relationships
between fertility and income, and fertility and education which emerge from the Census
8The strong negative correlation between fertility and occupation of the husband could be because
husband's time is also an important input into child-rearing, contrary to what is typically assumed in
this literature, or, because the hypothesis that children are normal goods is simply not true.
6data. In Section 5, we look at four other dimensions that show interesting variation in
fertility patterns: race, immigration status, region, and urbanization. Conclusions are
o®ered in Section 6.
2 Previous Work on Fertility and Income
In this section, we brie°y review the previous literature on the relationship between fer-
tility and measures of economic well-being. This literature is partly from Demography
and Sociology and partly from Economics. It is, by necessity, incomplete.
Most of the papers in Demography and Sociology have dealt with parts of the history
of US fertility, and many of them have also used data from the Census. Most of these
papers deal with fertility decisions either for speci¯c time periods or speci¯c demographic
groups. Examples include the study of the sub-group of white women between 1886 and
1900 (Tolnay, S. E., S. N. Graham, and A. M. Guest, (1982)), the analysis of Norwe-
gian immigrants (Gjerde, J. and A. McCants, (1995)), coal miners (Haines (1978)) and
Mormons in Utah (Anderton, D. L. (1986)). They touch on a variety of relevant issues
{ the role that religion and urbanization played in fertility reduction, etc. As is common
in that literature, they deal with fairly speci¯c questions - what roles were played by the
spacing of births and delayed marriage play in the Fertility Transition in the US? And,
what exactly was the timing of the Fertility Transition in the US and how does it compare
to what has been found concerning Europe and earlier studies on the US (e.g., Hacker
(2003)). Thus, they are not concerned with the relationship between fertility and income
per se.
A general ¯nding in the empirical fertility literature is that income and fertility are
negatively correlated. This fact has been established both in time series and in cross
section.9 During development, most countries have experienced growing incomes and
declining fertility simultaneously, at least over the last couple of centuries. This `fertility
transition' and the general coincidence of its timing with per capita income growth has
been often mentioned in both Demography and Economics. In Demography the early
origins are often traced to Notestein (1945), but others give even earlier attributions.
(See Chenais (1992) for a discussion of the history of these ideas). The comparative roles
of development and other changes, like improved health and in particular, improved public
health provisions have long been debated in that literature { McKeown (1979) o®ers a
useful summary as well as a detailed analysis of the causal interpretations of changes in the
9See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for cross-country evidence.
7understanding of disease and health. He concludes that changes in health are not enough,
leaving development and/or economic growth as a sort of residual. A causal interpretation
of this relationship has been controversial in the demography literature (see Livi-Bacci,
(1990) and others). An early, explicit description of a possible mechanism behind this
empirical link which is well known in Demography is Caldwell's `wealth °ows' theory,
(see Caldwell (1982)). In this descriptive theory, he portrays the Demographic Transition
as resulting from the breakdown of the typical decision-making structure of the nuclear
family (wherein the family head makes most of the decisions for the group including
those concerning fertility). Caldwell argues that this breakdown leads to a reversal of
wealth °ows within the family, originally from child to parent now from parent to child,
which makes children more costly and therefore leads to a decline in fertility. Caldwell
associates this family breakdown with the process of income growth, urbanization, and
industrialization, which have typically come together as a part of economic development,
but he does not give explicit reasons for why this breakdown in decision-making is a
necessary byproduct of development.
These ideas also have a long history in Economics. For example, in his introduction to
an early collected volume on Fertility Choice and Economics, Schultz (1973) asks: \What
is the explanation of the demographic transition, that is, how do we explain the economic
and social processes and family behavior that accounts for the marked decline from very
high birth and death rates to modern very low birth and death rates?" Although most
of the papers in that volume are static in nature and it is understood that this is a
considerable weakness, Schulz is explicit in his view that using the models developed
therein to conduct comparative statics exercises with respect to changes over time in the
value of education, the cost of birth control and \the secular rise in family income" mark a
useful ¯rst step. (See also De Tray, Willis, and Becker and Lewis (and others) in that same
1973 volume.) More recent references include, but are not limited to, Becker (1992), Galor
and Weil (1999), Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Lucas (2002). Some of this discussion
has focused on the evolution of averages within a cohort over the development process
and the corresponding income growth while other parts have focused on cross-sectional
phenomena at a given point in time.
The relationship between fertility and income has also been studied at business cycle
frequencies. Here the answers are less clear cut, however. Some authors ¯nd a positive
correlation between income and fertility over the business cycle (e.g. Simon (1969, 1977),
and Mikevska and Zak (2002) for Central and Eastern Europe). Butz and Ward (1979),
on the other hand, ¯nd that fertility has been counter-cyclical in recent U.S. data.
8Most cross sectional studies ¯nd a negative correlation between income and fertility.
For example, Borg (1989) ¯nds a negative relationship using panel data from South Korea
in 1976 and Docquier (2004) documents a similar relationship for the U.S. using data from
the PSID in 1994. Westo® (1954) ¯nds a negative relationship between fertility and oc-
cupational status for the years 1900-1952 using U.S. Census data. It is sometimes argued
that early on in the development process, a positive relationship between income and
fertility existed. However, studies documenting such a positive relationship empirically
are rare.10 Weir (1995) ¯nds a weakly positive relationship between economic status and
fertility in 18th century France, while Wrigley (1961) and Haines (1976) document higher
fertility in the coal mining areas of France and Prussia than in surrounding agricultural
areas during the end of the 19th century. Simon (1977, ch. 16) documents a positive rela-
tionship between farm size in hectors and the average numbers of children born for rural
areas in Poland in 1948 and Clark and Hamilton (2006) document a positive relationship
between occupational status and the number of surviving children in England in the late
16th and early 17th century (see also Clark (2005, 2007)).
The negative relationship between income and fertility has been viewed as a puzzle by
many economists: If children are a normal good, then the quantity should go up as income
goes up. Indeed, this was one of the important motivations for Becker's development of
the `quantity-quality' model of fertility choice { should a parent have a large number of
children but give them little in way of economic advantage, or, have few children each
with a large bequest, or large educational expenditure? This has generated a number of
new theories (see Macunovich (1996) for a survey) as well as large number of empirical
studies testing these re¯ned theories.
One theory emphasizes the importance of wages as the shadow price of time. A
higher income typically also means a higher wage. If children are time intensive, then the
opportunity cost goes up with income, and consumers might demand fewer children in
response to rising income. An extensive empirical literature trying to verify this \price
of time theory" exists. There seems to be a broad consensus that the price of time
(typically measured as wages, in particular, female wages) is indeed negatively correlated
with fertility. This has been con¯rmed in many di®erent empirical cross-sectional studies
(see Rosenzweig (1990) for an analysis of India, Indonesia and the Philippines, Schultz
(1986) for an analysis of U.S. data and Schultz (1997) for a recent survey).
10A more recent version of such a positive relationship is that U.S. fertility is higher than most other
countries in the OECD even though U.S. income is higher. This does not hold for a larger set of countries
however. See Ahn and Mira (2002) for the discussion of a related point.
9A second theory is the \relative income hypothesis" ¯rst proposed by Easterlin, who
argues that income relative to parents' income is important for fertility decisions.11 People
form habits about an \acceptable standard of living" during childhood, and then their
own income relative to this standard determines fertility decisions. Macunovich (1998)
provides a survey of the empirical literature on the Easterlin hypothesis. The evidence
is mixed, partly because there are at least four di®erent interpretations of the Easterlin
hypothesis.
Some studies make a distinction between husband's vs. wife's wage, and typically
¯nd a strong negative correlation between women's wages and fertility (supporting the
price of time theory) and a weakly positive, if any, relationship between male wages
and fertility. Freedman and Thornton (1982) ¯nd a small positive relationship between
husband's income and fertility using data from Detroit between 1962 and 1977. Heckman
and Walker (1990) ¯nd a weakly positive e®ect of male income on fertility in Swedish data.
Merrigan and St. Pierre (1998) con¯rm this result for Canada. Fleischer and Rhodes
(1979) also ¯nd a positive e®ect using U.S. data. Cho (1968) identi¯es no relationship
between income and fertility for whites in 1960 U.S. census data. Using aggregate U.S.
data, Butz and Ward (1979) also argue that male earnings have a positive e®ect on the
total fertility rate. Finally, Schultz (1986) ¯nds no evidence that non-employment income
or physical wealth is positively related to fertility using 1967 U.S. data.
We conclude that despite the extensive empirical work, there is still no conclusive
evidence on the exact relationship between income and fertility. Quoting Heckman and
Walker (1990), \Most economists would agree with Ward and Butz (1980) that current
and future wages and income [...] are likely determinants of fertility. There is little
agreement beyond this."
The literature on the relationship between Education and Fertility is similar to that
on Income and Fertility. There is general acceptance of the idea that there is a negative
correlation between them, based partly on time series observations for the developed
countries (i.e., education rose throughout the development process while fertility fell)
and partly on a widespread group of studies conducted on cross sections for individual
countries. Indeed, this is one of Caldwell's central predictions about fertility, viz., that
as countries adopted universal primary schooling, fertility would naturally fall (Caldwell,
1982). An excellent survey of this prevailing view and its many manifestations can be
found in Cleland (2004). More recently, much of the work has focused on the relationship
between the education of the mother and fertility, and it has been argued that this has
11See for example Easterlin (1966).
10stronger predictive power than many of the other typically used variables including socio-
economic status (e.g., income or occupation of the husband). This view began with the
study of the relationship between mother's education and infant mortality in data from
Nigeria by Caldwell (1979) and has been extended to cover other demographic variates
since then. (See for example Breierova and Du°o (2004) on Indonesia, and Akmam (2002)
on Bangladesh.)
Many of the comments above concerning past studies on the relationship between
income and fertility also apply to the relationship between education and fertility. For
example, since there is a lack of long panel data sets available, it is di±cult to decompose
the changes seen in time series data on fertility at the aggregate level into two components,
one constituting movements of the education distribution along a given education/fertility
relationship, the other movements of the relationship itself.
The empirical literature su®ers from three main problems. First, many data sources
have information only on fertility or on wages (income), not both simultaneously. Many
studies use fertility micro data and match this with wage information from the census
by region. For example Heckman and Walker (1990) use age and sex speci¯c wages from
tax return data. Because of this, most of the identi¯cation comes from cohort variation,
rather than cross-sectional variation. It seems that the question whether richer families
have more children cannot be addressed in a very satisfactory fashion with this data.
Secondly, there is a lack of cross-sectional studies over time.12 The typical analysis is
either based on micro evidence for one year or on aggregate time series data. Hence, one
cannot address the question: How much of the observed drop in fertility over time comes
from following a time invariant relationship between income and fertility with income
simply increasing over time? This is an interesting accounting exercise, but it requires a
time series of cross sectional data sets. The closest in spirit to this is probably Strulik and
Sikandar (2002) who use a panel of countries to analyze the relationship between fertility
and GDP across countries and over time. They ¯nd an `income threshold' below which
there is no relationship between income and fertility, and above which fertility declines
exponentially with income. Another comprehensive analysis is Haines (1979) who analyzes
the relationship between fertility and occupation in a variety of geographic locations in
the U.S. and Europe during the ¯fty year period between 1850 and 1900. Haines' research
shows robust occupational fertility di®erential throughout this time period. However, the
emphasis of this work is on coal mining and metallurgy, and his work does not extend
12One notable exception is Westo® (1954), who analyzes U.S. fertility for six di®erent occupations from
1900 to 1952.
11into the 20th century.
Finally, there is disagreement on what the right measures are, i.e. income vs. earn-
ings, wages of men vs. women etc. Of course, the answer depends on the theory under
investigation and hence, this is not a discord that can be resolved empirically. Therefore,
while our analysis contributes to the ¯rst two points, we have little to say about this last
point.
3 Basic Trends in US Fertility
Economic models focus on the decisions made by individual households and hence, one
would like a measure of fertility decisions at the individual household level. A measure
close to this that is available is Children Ever Born (CEB) from the U.S. Census. For the
years 1900 to 1990 one of the questions asked on the census form was, for each woman, how
many children they had had during their lives. Like all data in the census, this measure
is a voluntary response and hence is probably measured with some error, even at the level
of the individual observation. However, even with its limitations, this is probably the
best source for actual fertility decisions made by women. Since the age of the respondent
is also available, this allows us to obtain estimates of actual realized fertility for women
by birth cohort. For the purposes of economic models, where it is total planned fertility
that is usually used as the decision variable, this data is most useful for women who
have completed their planned fertility. Of course, it is impossible to tell from the data
in the census if a woman has truly completed her planned fertility, but, as a proxy, by
conditioning on age a reliable estimate of completed fertility can be obtained. For most
cases, we focus on women 40-49 years old and we supplement this with other ages to get
a longer time series, details are given in Appendix A. Finally, since the ¯rst census data
available on CEB is from 1900, and because there is a wide variety of ages in that data set,
we go back as far as the 1826-30 birth cohort by focusing on up to 70-74 year old women.
The last cohort we consider is the 1956-60 cohort, consisting of women 30-34 years old in
the 1990 census.13 This methodology allows us to obtain, from a single source, a fairly
complete picture of the history of US fertility since the beginning of the 19th Century.
Throughout this paper, we restrict our attention to `marital fertility,' i.e., the com-
pleted fertility of those women who, when they answer the census, indicate that they are
13Not all women in this cohort will have completed their life-time fertility, and hence the last two
cohorts in our time series should be interpreted with some caution.
12married.14 Of course some women get divorced, while others bear children out of wedlock.
There are two reasons for focusing on CEB of currently married women. First, before
1970 the census recorded CEB only for women who had been married at some point.
Second, since the main focus of this paper is on fertility decisions as a function of income
and wealth, we do not want to mix single-parent households with two-parent households.
To get a sense of non-marital fertility, we also computed CEB for women who were
not married when they answered the census (with the caveat that never married women
are included only from 1970 on). We ¯nd that, as expected, the level of CEB is lower
for unmarried women { on average by half a child { but that the time pattern looks
very similar.15 Certainly out of wedlock childbearing is an important and increasing
phenomenon in recent years. The fraction of all children born to women who are unmarried
at the time of giving birth has increased from less than 5% in 1920 to 10% in 1970 and
more than 30% by 2000 (Greenwood and Guner 2005). However, this does not mean that
our methodology necessarily misses a third of all births in the last cohorts because many
of these single mothers marry later on. Of course, given the striking increase in births
to unmarried women in recent years, it would be of considerable interest to extend our
analysis to single mothers as well.
Figure 1 shows CEB over time for women born between 1826 and 1960. As can be
seen from the ¯gure there are two noticeable features that really stand out. The ¯rst
is the long-term reduction in overall fertility that has occurred over the last 200 years.
Fertility was roughly constant at 5.5 children for the thirty years between the 1828 and
1853 cohorts. It fell slightly for the next decade, towards ¯ve CEB in 1863, while the
decline was very steep thereafter: a decline of 1.5 children between the 1863 and 1873
birth cohorts. Over the next 35 years, the decline slowed down again, with an additional
decrease of 1.2 children over the entire time period. The overall fertility decline was
substantial, starting with about 5.5 children per woman born in 1828 falling to about two
children for women born in our last cohort, 1958.
The second feature that stands out is the baby bust and baby boom that occurred
14By focusing on currently married women, we are on average including about 70% of all women.
However, this percentage di®ers considerably by cohorts, with a low of only 30% 1828 cohort, which is
based on 70-74 year old women, and thus many widows, and a high 82% in the 1918 cohort who we
include as 40-44 year olds.
15The gap in CEB varies from cohort to cohort, ranging from a high of 1.3 in the 1858 birth cohort
to a low of -0.1 in the 1873 cohort. However, these numbers are di±cult to interpret given that never
married women were not asked about their children until 1970 and the proportion of singles vs. widows
and divorced women varies considerably by age.
13Figure 1: CEB by Birth Cohort
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during the period from 1920 to 1960. Since the graph is by birth year, this is shown as a
dramatic reduction in CEB among women born around 1908 for whom CEB falls to 2.3
and the subsequent increase among women born between 1908 and 1933 where it increases
up to 3.3 for the 1933 cohort. The birth cohorts between 1898 to 1913 had exceptionally
low fertility given the time { it constitutes a group of women that had fewer children than
both their mothers, and their daughters. It is di±cult to know, and it has been an issue
of some discussion in Demography if this drop is simply a continuation of the Fertility
Transition, or if, as some have hypothesized, fertility among those groups of women (the
1898, 1903, 1908 and 1913 birth cohorts) was lower than trend because so much of their
fertile lifetimes occurred during the Great Depression. Indeed, Richard Easterlin's theory
of the Baby Boom is in part based on the idea that fertility was so high in the 1950's
exactly because it was so low in the 1930's. To ease exposition we will call this period of
low fertility `the baby bust of the 1930's.'16
16Note that the term \baby bust" is also often used to describe the period directly after the baby
boom, while we use it for the period right before the baby boom.
14One thing that is immediately obvious from data on CEB is that contrary to what
one might have expected, the baby boom and baby bust cycle is not merely a product of
delayed fertility. That is, one hypothesis is that fertility was temporarily delayed in the
1930s and 1940s due ¯rst to the Depression and then World War II. Subsequently, those
same women increased their fertility after these unique events had passed. This version
of the data shows that this is clearly not true, however. Those women born between 1906
and 1910 had lower lifetime fertility than those born later, despite the overall downward
trend. A second hypothesis one might have is that the baby bust was mostly `caused' by a
larger fraction of women not marrying, while marital fertility has not changed. Since our
data are observations on marital fertility, and this shows a substantial decline, it is clear
that this is not the whole story. This clear distinction between changes in the number of
births per women and changes in the timing of births over the life-cycle is not possible
using most other measures of fertility.
The most common other measure of fertility is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). (See
Appendix D for de¯nitions of CEB, TFR, etc., and a detailed discussion of their proper-
ties.) The TFR is de¯ned as the sum of the age-speci¯c birth rates over all women alive
in a given year. Since it is computed using data from a given year, it is a mixture of the
fertility decisions of all birth cohorts alive at the time. If all of these cohorts have the same
fertility decisions, the two measures of fertility are identical. If fertility rates are changing
from cohort to cohort, then CEB gives the more accurate picture of fertility decisions
since it does not mix the fertility decisions of di®erent cohorts. Moreover, in periods of
declining fertility (as occurred during the Demographic Transition for example), TFR for
any year overestimates fertility for young cohorts and underestimates it for older ones.
CEB does have weaknesses, however. For example, if calculated using a group of
women at a given age, it is an unbiased measure of expected fertility to that age, con-
ditional on surviving to that age. It will be an overestimate of unconditional expected
fertility to that age when maternal mortality risk is positive and fertility choice and
mortality risk are independent. This e®ect is present in the data to some degree since
mortality rates for women during child bearing years are signi¯cant during the earlier
parts of the period we consider.17 Another issue that arises is the choice of age, A, at
which the women are sampled. If A is chosen to be too low, CEB is a poor estimate of
completed fertility { it is too low. On the other hand, when fertility plans are systemati-
cally related to mortality risk (for example through income), this can lead to sensitivity of
CEB to A. Thus, when A is chosen to be too large, CEB can again be a poor estimate of
17TFR su®ers from similar, related di±culties, see the Appendix for more discussion.
15completed fertility. By looking at successive censuses, we can compare fertility estimates
for women of a given birth year cohort but of di®erent ages when answering the survey.
We have plotted all possible combinations in Figure A1 in Appendix E. The ¯gure shows
that the estimates di®er most for the earlier cohorts. It can also be seen that longevity is
negatively correlated with fertility { estimates of fertility for a given cohort in successive
censuses (and hence for older women) fall.18
The di®erences between TFR and CEB can be seen in Figure 1 which shows both
TFR and CEB over the history of the US.19 To make the two time series comparable, we
shift TFR by 27 years as this aligns the peak of the baby boom in the two series.20 Note
that the decline in CEB during the Demographic Transition happened much faster than
is apparent from the TFR numbers. CEB fell by about one and a half children for women
born only 10 years apart: CEB for the 1861-1865 cohort was 5.0 and dropped to 3.4 for
the 1871-1875 cohort. In contrast, the same fall in TFR takes 4 decades: TFR in 1843
was 4.9 and fell to 3.5 in 1883. This di®erence is due to the way TFR mixes cohorts in a
given year. Also note that TFR increases the size of the baby boom over that displayed
in CEB. From trough to peak CEB displays a di®erence of 0.9 children, compared to 1.4
for TFR. This is because, although delayed fertility for a given woman was not the whole
story in the baby boom, it was part of it.21
The average value of CEB (or TFR) is only one of many possible ways of summarizing
the history of fertility. It is a summary of the fertility experiences of many di®erent women
and completely abstracts from the diversity in experiences. A drop in CEB (or TFR) from
four to two, for example, could be due to all women decreasing births from four to two
or half of all females decreasing fertility to zero, while the other half remains at four, or
any other convex combination. By looking at the average only, one completely abstracts
from changes in the distribution of children across women within a birth cohort. The
distribution, however, has also changed. Figure A2 in Appendix E shows the fractions
18One reason for this ¯nding is that longevity is positively related to income. As we show later, it is
also true that richer people have fewer children. It then follows naturally that average CEB for a given
cohort is negatively related to age. Another possible bias is selective memory: especially children that
die as infants might be remembered less as the mother ages.
19We constructed TFR numbers by using Haines' (1994) estimates for TFR for black and white women
assuming that the fraction of black women has remained constant at 10% over the time period, and
ignoring other ethnicities.
20Note that the average age of ¯rst marriages ranges between 20 and 25 years for women over this
time period (US Census 2006). Hence, the implication that the \average birth" occurs at age 27 seems
reasonable.
21The point that part of the baby boom was due to an overlap in timing is also made in Russell (1982).
16of women having a given number of children. Overall, the fraction of women with 0 and
1 children does not show much trend, being on average 10% over the entire time period
considered. The percentage with 2 and 3 children has gone up signi¯cantly, from about
10% each over the cohorts born from 1818 to 1868 to 40% and 20%, respectively, for the
1958 cohort.22 The percentage of women with 4 or more children, on the other hand, has
dropped sharply from more than 60% for women born before 1860 down to about 10% for
the most recent cohorts. The baby bust and boom can also be clearly identi¯ed. During
the baby bust, 40% of married women had one child or no children, which is the highest
it has ever been. One might have thought that the distribution of CEB across women is
shifting to the left in a ¯rst order stochastic dominance sense, however, as Figure A3 in
Appendix E shows, this is clearly not true.


































As another way of analyzing changes in the distribution of CEB over time, we com-
puted the standard deviation of the CEB distribution for all cohorts. Figure 2 shows that
the standard deviation has been monotonically falling over time. An interesting ¯nding
is that there is no increase in the standard deviation during the baby boom even though
the mean increased a lot. In other words, the whole distribution just shifted out by about
22See also David and Sanderson (1987) on the emergence of the \2-child norm."
17one child without a corresponding increase in the spread during that period.
Demographers have put forth many alternative hypotheses to explain why the Fer-
tility Transition seen in these data occurred how and when it did (see Alter (1992) for
a summary). Some of these hypotheses are based on simple compositional arguments {
suppose group A has lower fertility than group B and the relative sizes of group A and B
are changing. In the remainder of this section, we use the Census data on CEB to address
the most common of these hypotheses { di®erences by location (urban vs. rural, farm vs.
non-farm, and region), race, and immigrant status. We ¯nd that the main features of the
US fertility history are common across all of these groups and that, indeed, di®erences
between the groups have largely disappeared.


































We begin with the di®erence between rural and urban populations. Over this time
horizon there were both large movements from rural to urban areas and large di®erences
between urban and rural fertility. Of the 1928 birth cohort, only 25% lived in urban
areas, whereas about 75% of the last birth cohort (1958) live in urban areas. Figure 3
includes a time series of CEB for women living in urban vs. rural areas. The ¯gure shows
that women in rural areas had a substantially higher number of children than in urban
18settings.23 The di®erence is fairly stable at about 1 Children per Woman (CPW) until
the 1923 birth cohort, after which the gap narrows to less than half a child, and by 1938,
fertility in urban and rural areas is nearly indistinguishable. Thus, although there has
always been some di®erence in the fertility behavior of these areas, and although this was
signi¯cant in the early years, it is clear that the Fertility Decline is not simply the product
of a movement from high and constant fertility rural areas to low and constant, fertility
urban areas.24 There are some other interesting di®erences in the fertility histories of
these two types of areas as well { for example the baby boom was much more pronounced
in urban areas, where CEB increased from 2 in 1908 to 3 CPW in 1928, compared to
an increase of only 0.4 children for rural women, etc. The distinction between farm and
non-farm families paints essentially the same picture as urban and rural (see Table A6).
Another often discussed pattern in the history of fertility is di®erences by race. From
Figure 3 we see that although black fertility has always been, and still is, higher than
that of whites, the basic patterns of fertility history are similar. Not only are the overall
patterns of fertility similar { a long decline, a baby bust, a baby boom and the subsequent
decline { we also see that the di®erence in fertility by race has fallen dramatically. The
di®erence has at times been substantial, for example 5.5 vs. 7.1 in 1828, but, in the most
recent cohort we study, 1958, it is down to a di®erence of only 0.2 children.
The overall pattern of gradual fertility decline, followed by a sharp baby bust and
a baby boom can also be found for women of di®erent immigrant status. The level of
fertility, however, di®ers substantially by immigration status as Figure A4(a) in Appendix
E shows.25 Starting with the 1838 cohort, second generation Americans (i.e. women born
in the U.S. with at least one immigrant parent) had consistently lower fertility rates than
women born in the U.S. (see also King and Ruggles (1990) on this). Women born in foreign
countries, on the other hand, had about a half child more than the average throughout the
entire 19th century. This pattern reversed during the baby bust period { starting from the
1898 cohort { when women born abroad had fewer children than native born Americans.
That is, the decline in CEB during the baby bust period (1893-1908 cohorts) is steepest for
immigrants. This reversal may re°ect the time period rather than a changing relationship
23One hypothesis is that the costs of raising children are higher in urban areas than in rural settings.
24Indeed, using actual CEB numbers for the 1828 cohort (5.9 for rural and 4.7 for urban) together
with the fact that by 1958 three quarters of the population lived in urban areas while only one quarter
remained in rural areas would imply that CEB should have decreased from 5.6 in 1828 to 5 in 1958, only
a small fraction of the actual observed decline.
25The graph ends with the 1928 cohort, because information on immigration was collected only up
until the 1970 Census.
19caused by the baby bust itself. In this period total immigration is falling: the fraction of
immigrants in our sample of married women declines from about 20% in the 1898 cohort
to roughly 10% in the 1908 cohort. One possibility is that immigrants moving to the
U.S. in the 1920's and 1930's may be atypical { i.e., a sample selection issue may arise
in immigrants during the Great Depression. In addition to this e®ect, this is a period
in which the fraction of European immigrants is steeply declining from 90% in 1893 to
70% by 1908, while Asian and South American immigration is starting to increase. If
European immigrants were, on average, richer than those from Asia and South America
this could cause a steep decline like this because of the fact that the Baby Bust was more
pronounced for the lower part of the income distribution
Figure A4(b) in Appendix E shows the time series of CEB in four di®erent regions
of the country.26 As can be seen although there are stark di®erences across the regions
early on the overall patterns are similar and the di®erences are small in the most recent
cohorts. The South Western regions have the highest fertility, with almost 7 children
per woman early on, compared to New England that had CEB rates as low as 4, even
for women born in the middle of the 19th century.27 These cross-regional di®erences are
larger than urban-rural di®erences (compare Figure A4(b) to Figure 3), and hence, these
di®erences are not due solely to di®erences in the urban-rural composition of the areas.
Note also that the proportion of women living in the low fertility regions (North England
and East North Central) is shrinking over time, while the proportion living in the high
fertility regions (South Atlantic and West South Central) is growing. Hence, an appeal to
westward migration as an explanation of the Fertility Transition actually goes the wrong
way.
26These regions do not exhaust the U.S. but they are representative in that they show the entire
spectrum of regional di®erences. The regions that we use are: New England Division (Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont), East North Central Division (Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin), South Atlantic Division (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia), and West South Central
Division (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma/Indian Territory, Texas).
27Vandenbroucke (2004) argues that people move from East to West precisely because they know they
want large families and land is cheaper there. Alternatively, note that the Western states had the highest
ratios of males to females, and thus it is plausible that only those men with the highest desire to reproduce
married, driving up the average fertility for women (but not men).
204 Economic Determinants of Fertility in the U.S. Cen-
sus Data
In this section we look at several re¯nements of the time series of fertility examined above.
In particular, we study how fertility is related to various measures of income and education
and how the relationship has changed over time.
One of the hypotheses that demographers and economists both put forth is that the
reduction in fertility that occurred during the Demographic Transition was primarily due
to the increase in per capita income that occurred over the same period (see Alter (1992)
for a summary of theories of the Demographic Transition). The simplest implementation
of this idea is that for any given cohort, there is a negative relationship between fertility
and income, and that growth in GDP per capita simply pushes more and more people
into the low fertility range. Thus, this hypothesis can be succinctly summarized as: The
fertility decline is due to a move along a time independent relationship between fertility
and income. One of our goals is to document to what extent this holds for the U.S.
fertility history, and to what extent this transition was a shift of this relationship instead.
To do this, we will examine the link between CEB and those measures of economic well
being that exist in the Census.
With perfect capital and income insurance markets, economic models say that fertility
decisions of a household (and all other decisions as well) are functions of the present
discounted value of the entire lifetime stream of income °ows only{ i.e., `wealth' in the
economic sense.28 When capital and insurance markets are imperfect, other variables also
enter this picture { the degree of individual restrictions on borrowing, the history of `luck'
that the individual has had with respect to income and other shocks. Even if the perfect
capital and insurance market hypothesis were correct, no simple measure for the present
discounted value of the entire lifetime stream of income °ows is available. Because of this,
it is necessary, both here and in other studies, to use proxies.
Data on occupation are available over the entire period that we study, 1900 to 1990;
income measures were collected by the Census beginning with the 1950 Census; an es-
timated house value was collected in the 1940 census and from 1960 to date; education
data has been collected since the 1940 Census. Each of these measures has pluses and
minuses as indicators of true economic wealth. Current income is a tight measure of one
term in the present discounted value calculation mentioned above, and would be a very
28Throughout this paper, we use the terms \economic wealth" and \present discounted value of life-time
income" interchangeably.
21good estimate if income did not change over time. However, it is well known that it
does change systematically over the life cycle, and also has a large `error term.' This is
due in part to business cycle frequency movements, and in part due to individual speci¯c
°uctuations. Also, it is only available for a subset of the time period we are interested
in. House value likely su®ers greatly from reporting error and is also available only for a
small subset of the years, but it has the advantage that it is more stable over time than
income °ows.29 Educational attainment is also more stable over time, at the individual
level, than income since it is not subject to business cycle frequency °uctuations nor idio-
syncratic shocks. However, it is also an imperfect measure of wealth (i.e., the conditional
variability of wealth given years of education is high), and it is only available for the
most recent censuses. Occupation is the economic variable that has the most coverage
since data has been collected on it over the entire period of study. Like education, it is
typically not subject to movements over time. It su®ers from two di±culties however.
First, not all individuals of a given occupation have the same wealth. Second, occupation
itself does not easily translate into a dollar wealth equivalent. There is very little that
can be done about the ¯rst problem. For the second, a measure, Occupational Income,
has been created (see Ruggles et al (2004)) that we will use as the basis for a proxy.
Table 1: Correlation between OI and current income of husbands
Cohort Census Year Age Correlation
1913 1960 47 0.49
1918 1960 42 0.48
1923 1970 47 0.47
1928 1970 42 0.46
1933 1980 47 0.45
1938 1980 42 0.44
1943 1990 47 0.45
1948 1990 42 0.45
1953 1990 37 0.44
1958 1990 32 0.40
In sum, various possible measures exist, but they are all imperfect. Our approach will
be to use Occupation as our baseline measure of economic wealth since it is available for
29Moreover, house value is only reported for house owners, not renters.
22a longer time period. The correlation coe±cient between current income and occupation
are between 0.4 and 0.5 for the years in which both measures are available, see Table 1.
We also look at education, as education is a measure that allows us to look at husbands
and wives separately.
4.1 Occupational Income and Fertility
The Occupational Income Score (OIS) is a constructed variable that assigns each occu-
pation in all years a value representing the median total income (in hundreds of 1950
dollars) of all persons with that particular occupation in 1950.30 For example, the OIS
of a carpenter in 1850 is equal to that of a carpenter in 1980 and both are equal to the
median carpenter income in 1950. That is, if relative incomes of di®erent occupations
were constant over time, and all individuals in a given occupation had the same income,
the OIS would perfectly rank people by current income. Of course, some occupations
have risen or fallen in the income ladder and not all individuals within a given occupation
have the same present discounted value of income. But, overall, it seems to be a good
approximation. Nevertheless, since it gives the same score to carpenters in 1850 and 1950
without adjusting for trend growth, it misses the fact that carpenters, and all other oc-
cupations, in 1950 are richer than carpenters in 1850. This can be partially corrected for
by adjusting for trend growth in income, which we will do below.
Prior to 1960, occupations were only recorded for persons in the labor force. Hence,
the variable OIS is not available for persons not in the labor force in the early years.
Speci¯cally this means that information on OIS is not available for many women, and
that the proportion of women with valid OIS is continuously increasing over the time
period considered. Because of these limitations, we examine the relationship between
CEB and OIS for women in households where the husband is present. The variability
of CEB at a given level of income is high and makes identifying systematic relationships
di±cult. For this reason, and to counteract errors in variables induced by using OIS as
a proxy of wealth, we ¯rst divide the observations into deciles by OIS. Further, since
occupational income score assigns the dollar income of the relevant occupation in 1950
dollars, it will miss the e®ects of trend growth for all occupations. To account for this
e®ect, we adjusted income scores such that average income grows 2% annually.31 In
30See http://www.ipums.org/usa/chapter4/chapter4.html for details.
31We use a 2% trend because this is the average growth rate of output per working age person during
the 20th century in the United States (Prescott 2002). We prefer to use a general trend rather than
actual GDP growth over this period because we interpret OIS as a measure of life-time earnings rather
23addition, we convert 1950 dollars into 2000 dollars using the CPI. We call this adjusted
occupational income score simply occupational income (OI).
In Figure 4 we plot these decile by decile averages of CEB against OI for each birth
cohort. Thus, each point in Figure 4 represents the average CEB of wives of men in one
OI decile, for a particular birth cohort of women.32 (Table A4 in Appendix B includes the
actual numbers.) For each cohort, we ¯nd a strong negative relationship between OI and
CEB. For all cohorts, we ¯nd that CEB decreases monotonically across OI deciles, with
the occasional exception at the very bottom of the distributions. In the early cohorts
(until 1898) CEB actually increases from decile 1 to decile 2. We also ¯nd that the
relationship is very °at at the upper end of the income distribution, i.e. there is little
di®erence in CEB between the top two deciles, starting with the 1908 cohort.
Figure 4: CEB by Occupational Income in 2000 Dollars
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One hypothesis is that the fertility decline was driven solely through the increase in
income. While our analysis has nothing to contribute on causality, we can investigate
than actual income in the year in which data was recorded.
32As before, for each cohort, we compute average fertility for women in a ¯ve year age bracket, as
described in Appendix A.
24to what extent the data is consistent with such a theory. Let Fit denote the number of
children ever born for person i in cohort t. The most extreme version of the hypothesis
that di®erences in fertility are completely driven by di®erences in income would be that
Fit is a time invariant function of present discounted lifetime income (LI). That is:
Fit = G(LIit)
where LIit is the lifetime income of person i in cohort t and G is a time invariant function.
This version would have the implication that, although overall fertility could change over
time due to the movements in average LIit, conditional on lifetime income, fertility should
be unchanged over time.
If this were true { and assuming that OI is a good measure for lifetime income {
all of the data in Figure 4 would then lie on the curve, F = G(LI). Since there has
been such a large increase in average income, the extent to which this is true is di±cult
to discern in Figure 4, which plots CEB against OI. To more clearly illuminate this
relationship, we show the relationship between the natural logarithms of CEB and OI
in Figure 5. In addition to the data, this picture includes a ¯tted relationship (OLS
regression) based on data from all cohorts. The relationship between CEB and OI looks
surprisingly time invariant. The estimated relationship is log(CEB) = 4:82¡0:38log(OI)
with an extremely high R2 of 0.82. Therefore, much of the observed overall fertility change
seen between the 1828 and 1958 birth cohorts seems consistent with this view.
However, the picture also shows systematic deviations from such a stable relationship.
As can be seen, while the 1828 and 1948 birth cohorts are approximately right on the
¯tted curve, the baby bust cohorts are clearly below, and the baby boom cohorts are
clearly above. Thus, it seems that there are other, large e®ects that are missing from this
view, and we will come back to this later.
Using the data underlying Figure 5, we can do a formal accounting decomposition of
the observed patterns from start to ¯nish into movements along a curve relating income
to fertility and shifts of that curve over time.33 To do this, we now ¯t a log-log regression
between average OI by decile of the population and average CEB within that decile
for each birth cohort. The slope coe±cient from this regression can be interpreted as
the income elasticity of the demand for children. The cohort-by-cohort elasticities are
given in Table A5 in Appendix B. Between the 1828 birth cohort and the 1958 one, OI
increased from $4,154 to $54,517, approximately a 13-fold increase. Based on the elasticity
33Such an accounting decomposition had not been possible previously as past empirical work focused
either exclusively on a time series or on a cross-section.
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CEB1828 = 2:4, while the actual value for women born in 1958
was 1.8. In this sense, 84% of the overall reduction of 3.8 CPW between 1828 and 1958
would have been predicted given the relationship between income and fertility ¯tted from
the 1828 birth cohort. Figure 6 illustrates this accounting exercise graphically.34
Of course, the results of calculations such as this depend on the details of how they are
done. For example, when using the elasticity that is estimated based on all data, -0.38,
we ¯nd that 92% of the overall fertility decline can be accounted for. Alternatively, if we
use the ¯tted relationship between OI and fertility based on the 1948 birth cohort, we ¯nd
that only 60% of the decline can be accounted for. To see this, not that average income
in 1898 was only 30% of the average income in 1948 and in 1828 it was only 9% of 1948
income. Based on this, the average fertility of 2.22 in 1948 and the estimated elasticity
of -0.20, we would predict that fertility should have been 3.54 in 1828 (it was actually
5.59 ) and 2.70 for the 1898 birth cohort (it was actually 2.82). Thus, this version of the
34>From the ¯gure, it appears that only 7 deciles are present in the 1828 birth cohort. This is because
several deciles have the same occupational income. These are deciles 2-5. See Table A.4 for the actual
values for all 10 deciles.
26Figure 6: 1958 Predicted vs. Actual CEB (based on 1828 data)
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calculations would say that the log linear relationship would account for about 60% of
the observed di®erences in fertility levels between the 1828 and 1948 cohorts.
4.1.1 Decreasing Fertility Inequality
Some interesting deviations from a time invariant relationship exist. The most striking
pattern is the \compression of fertility" over time, i.e. that fertility became less income
sensitive over time. There are several ways to measure this. We look at two measures: the
change, over time, in the absolute di®erence in CEB from the bottom to the top halves of
the income distribution, and the change, over time, in the estimated income elasticity of
demand for children. The di®erence from the top to the bottom of the income distribution
of fertility has been falling, reaching an all-time low of a ¯fth of a child in 1953. This
can be clearly seen in Figure 7 which shows average CEB of women with husbands above
and below median occupational income over time. Note, however, that this decline did
not occur monotonically. Roughly, there was a di®erence of about 1 child in the early
cohorts, increasing to a high of 1.6 with the 1863 cohort, then rapidly falling to only half
a child by 1908 and further falling to a quarter of a child by the 1923 birth cohort, where
it stabilized. Overall then, there has been a signi¯cant decrease not only in fertility but































also its top to bottom variation with respect to income { fertility has become `compressed'
with respect to income.
Part of this compression is what would be expected with movements along an iso-
elastic demand curve for children with a negative slope, but there are other forces at work
as well. To see this, note that our estimated income elasticities of demand for children have
also decreased (see Table A5). Interestingly, it changed in a non-monotone way over time,
rising from about -0.33 in the early years up to a peak of about -0.45 or -0.50 for cohorts
born in the late 1800's and down to about -0.20 in more recent times.35 The change in
the income elasticities is closely mirrored in overall changes in the fertility distribution.
Figure 8 plots the coe±cient of variation (CV) of the OI distribution over time. In the
same picture we have included the absolute value of the income elasticity. The fall in the
CV shows that over the entire time period, the variance of fertility fell by more than it
would have if fertility had just fallen proportionally throughout the entire distribution.
This is particularly true during the baby boom where the variance of fertility increased
by less than as if fertility had increased proportionally for everybody. Thus, the widening
35See Westo® (1954) for an early account of the widening and compression of fertility.
28and then compression in the relationship between income and fertility is closely re°ected
in changes of the overall fertility distribution.
























Income Elasticity of Fertility
(absolute value)
Note that the decline in elasticities immediately implies that the fertility compression
was not solely the result of a compression in income, at least in its simplest form { viz.,
that the income elasticity was constant but income compressed. This conclusion depends
on both the assumption that OI is a good proxy for income and the assumption that the
income elasticity is constant over time. As Goldin and Katz (1999) document, there has
been a compression of income due to a fall in the skill premium during the 20th century.
Thus, some of fertility compression may be due to the income compression.36 However, it
is also well-documented that income inequality and the skill premium rose again during
the later parts of the 20th century, while fertility compresses over the entire time period.
The reason for the overall widening of fertility during the 19th century is that the
timing of the Fertility Transition (1828-1898) did not occur evenly across the income
distribution. This can be most easily seen in Figure 7.37 Fertility for the bottom half was
roughly constant at about 6 between the 1828 and 1853 cohorts. After this, it fell steeply
to the 1898 cohort where it reached 3.3 children per woman (CPW), a reduction of 2.7
children overall. In contrast, for the upper half of the income distribution, the decline
36Similarly, if the relationship between LI and CEB is non-linear, but with a di®erent functional form,
the observed fertility compression could be due solely to income compression.
37See also Figure A5 in Appendix E which shows a ¯ner breakdown by income deciles.
29was more or less steady between the 1828 and 1898 birth cohorts from about 5.0 to 2.4
children per woman. Thus, the overall drop between the 1828 and 1898 birth cohorts
was similar in magnitude for women in both halves of the income distribution: falling by
about two and a half children. It follows that over the 70 year period there was little
change in the absolute di®erence in the number of children. Because of the di®erence in
timing, however, the overall changes mask the observation that in the interceding period
the CEB di®erence rose, reaching a maximum of about 1.6 CPW with the 1863 birth
cohort. In sum then, the Fertility Transition began early and was gradual for the upper
part of the income distribution while it began later, and was much steeper for the lower
part. Overall, the decline was similar in magnitude, but, because of the di®erence in
timing, the spread grew in the interim. This pattern mirrors closely the pattern seen
when the data is divided between urban and rural components as can be seen in Figure
9. The Fertility Transition began early and was gradual for women living in urban areas
while it began later, and was much steeper for those living in rural areas. (See also the
discussion in Section 5.)
Figure 9: CEB for Top/Bottom Half of Income Distribution and Urban/Rural Areas
































The fertility compression during the 20th century is related to a di®erence in magni-
30tudes of the baby bust and baby boom at di®erent parts of the income distribution. From
Figure 7 it can be seen that the baby bust was more pronounced for poorer families. Be-
tween 1898 and 1908, fertility declined from 3.3 to 2.6 CPW for the bottom half, and from
2.36 to 2.02 for the top half. That is, there was a reduction of 0.70 CPW for the bottom
half, compared to a fall of only 0.35 CPW for the top half of the income distribution. A
similar asymmetry also occurred during the baby boom period (1908-1933), which was
most pronounced for richer women. Women in the upper half of the income distribution
increased their fertility from 2.0 CPW in 1908 to 3.1 CPW in 1933. Women in the lower
half, in contrast, increased their fertility from 2.6 in 1908 to 3.3 in 1933. Thus, fertility
increased by 1.1 CPW for the top half and only 0.7 CPW for the lower half. Together,
the relatively steeper fall in CPW for poorer families and the subsequent milder increase
has led to a compression in fertility across the income distribution. Indeed, most of that
compression had been completed by the 1923 birth cohort, when the di®erence in average
fertility between the bottom and top halves fell from 0.93 to 0.24, where it still is today.
One might be concerned that the pattern of widening and then compression of fertility
with respect to income is an artifact of the data, driven by OI becoming an increasingly
worse estimate of lifetime income the further away one goes from the 1950 census. Recall
that OI was constructed as the median income of that occupation in 1950, and thus one
would expect OI to be a relatively good proxy for actual income in 1950. The further the
distance from the 1950 census, the larger one would expect the error to be, since some
occupations will have changed in relative status, etc. In principle, an increasing error
could be responsible for the fertility gap being largest in years where data is good and
decreasing in both directions from there. However, we strongly believe that this is not
the case. First, the peak is at the wrong time. The cohorts that are based on the 1950
census are the 1903 and 1908 cohorts, while we ¯nd the peak of the fertility gap between
bottom and top of the income distribution occurs in 1863, and we ¯nd the highest income
elasticity for the cohorts between 1883 and 1898. Secondly, actual income data is available
in four censuses (1960-1990). Using this data, we also ¯nd a substantial decline in the
fertility gap over this time period. Finally, the correlation between OIS and income falls
only by a small amount over this time period, as shown in Table 1, suggesting that the
error may have not increased by a large amount. Further details on this are included in
Appendix C.
314.1.2 Surviving Children Ever Born
The di®erence between gross and net fertility was quite substantial in the earlier years
of the time period that we study. As many as one third of children born did not reach
working age. It is clear that both gross and net fertility are important from an economic
point of view. Data limitations force us to abstract from mortality considerations for
the most part.38 To our knowledge, no estimates of the relationship between wealth and
infant and/or child mortality are available for the period we study.
















The census data does, however, contain some limited information on the surviving
number of children. In both the 1900 and the 1910 Censuses, all women who had ever
been married were asked about how many living children they currently had. In the
following, we will label this variable surviving children ever born (SCEB). We can replicate
our previous analysis using SCEB for the cohorts between 1828 and 1868, i.e. 9 cohorts.
All other cohorts were based on data from a census other than 1900 and 1910, so that no
information on SCEB is available.39
Not surprisingly, we ¯nd that a substantial number of children die before their mother.
The time series of SCEB together with CEB is plotted in Figure 10. The percentage of
38See also Haines and Preston (1996) and Ferrie (2003) on constructing mortality estimates from Census
data.
39The ¯gures contain data for the 1873 and 1878 cohorts, which are based on 32 and 37 year old women
in the 1910 census, i.e., these are age/cohort combinations that we do not use elsewhere in this paper.
32children that had died declines monotonically from 37% for the 1828 birth cohort to 21%
for the 1868 birth cohort. Note that this decline is not only due to declining mortality
rates because the age at which mortality is established changes in these measurements.
That is, for the 1828 birth cohort we measure the fraction of children that die before their
mother's 72nd birthday, while for the 1868 cohort survival is measured at their mother's
42nd birthday.40
The relationship between SCEB and occupational income is essentially the same as
between CEB and OI. That is, all our ¯ndings from the previous section, that fertility and
income are negatively related, and that this relationship has changed non-monotonically
over time, are robust to controlling for mortality. We ¯nd that the relationship between
income and SCEB is negative for every single cohort for which data is available. Figure
12 plots our two measures of the relationship between fertility and income (elasticity and
top to bottom gap) for all cohorts between 1828 and 1878. The graphs show how the
estimates based on the two measures of fertility track each other very closely.
















It is sometimes argued that mortality was higher among poor people because of the
di®erent hygienic circumstances. We cannot con¯rm this hypothesis in the Census data.
In fact, mortality (measured as a fraction of children that does not survive) is somewhat
higher among richer people. This might re°ect the fact that both incomes as well as
mortality were higher in urban areas.
40More precisely, for the 1828 cohort, we measure survival of children of women aged 70-74 at census
enumeration day, while for the 1868 it is measured for women aged 40-44 etc.
33Figure 12: Surviving Children Ever Born
















































344.2 Education and Fertility
Figure 13: CEB by Education of Husband



































Next, we turn to the relationship between fertility and education for those years in
which education data is available { the censuses from 1940 to date. Education provides
another measure of economic well-being. The advantage of using information on education
is that this data is available both for men and women for 100 years of birth cohorts (1868-
1958). This allows us to investigate husband's and wife's contribution to the fertility
decline separately.
To facilitate comparisons to the previous subsection we ¯rst focus on the education
of the husband. Figure 13 shows mean CEB by cohort and husband's years of schooling.
The ¯gure also includes a ¯tted line based on data from all cohorts.41 As with OI, we ¯nd
a substantial negative relationship between CEB and husband's education throughout
the entire time period. As with OI, there has been a considerable increase in the overall
level of education over the 100 years (see Table 2). Because of this, we can do the same
41As before, this regression is based on the cohort- and education-speci¯c mean CEB as shown in the
picture, not on the underlying individual level data.
35decomposition we did in the previous section, and ask whether the decline in CEB over
time is consistent with a movement along a stable time-invariant relationship between
education and fertility, or whether the relationship itself is changing. From the Figure,
it is clear that some of each is going on. Clearly, the later cohorts are characterized by
both higher education as well as lower CEB. However, for any given number of years of
schooling, CEB varies by about 1 child across cohorts. For example, wives of men with
12 years of education born in 1868 had 2.8 children, and this fell to about 1.9 children
per woman in the 1958 birth cohort. More generally, we can see a substantial downward
shift of the curve during the fertility transition (comparing the 1878 cohort with the the
1908 cohort), followed by an upward shift until the 1933 cohort (baby boom), followed by
a sharp collapse for the 1958 cohort.
To better quantify the relationship between education and fertility, and how this has
changed over time, we ran the following OLS regression for each cohort, t:
CEBit = ¯0t + ¯1t ¤ EdHit + "it
where each CEBit is the average CEB for women in cohort t with husbands who have i
years of schooling. As a measure of how sensitive fertility is to education, we report the
slope coe±cient in Table 2.
As in the relationship between CEB and OI, we ¯nd a substantial compression of
fertility across years of education between the 1868 and 1958 cohorts. Note that the
coe±cient in 1958 is about half the one in 1868. In contrast to the relationship between
CEB and OI, however, there is no widening at ¯rst. To some extent this is because we
have a shorter time series for the education variables.
The one exception to the general rule that higher education is associated with lower
fertility within a cohort can be found in the baby boom generations. That is, in both the
1918 and 1928 birth cohorts, wives of college educated men had slightly higher fertility
than those of high school educated men. Indeed, even in the birth cohorts from 1878 to
1908, there is very little di®erence in the fertility behavior of the wives of high school
and college educated men. This is consistent with our earlier ¯nding that the relationship
between OI and CEB °attens out for high levels of OI.
The baby bust and boom is a phenomenon that a®ected all schooling levels, as can be
seen in Figure A6 in Appendix E. Similarly to our income analysis, we ¯nd that the baby
bust was most pronounced for wives of little educated husbands while the baby boom was
most pronounced for wives of the highly educated husbands. Between the 1868 and the
1908 cohorts, wives of husbands with little education decreased their fertility from 4.8 to
36Table 2: Relationship between CEB and Husband's Education
Cohort Age ¯1t average years of education
1868 72 -0.17 6.51
1873 67 -0.19 6.62
1878 62 -0.14 6.86
1883 57 -0.16 7.05
1888 52 -0.14 7.12
1893 47 -0.15 7.49
1898 42 -0.13 7.78
1903 57 -0.14 8.27
1908 52 -0.14 8.83
1913 47 -0.13 9.35
1918 42 -0.12 9.94
1923 47 -0.12 10.73
1928 42 -0.12 11.05
1933 47 -0.12 11.63
1938 42 -0.15 12.03
1943 47 -0.11 12.87
1948 42 -0.11 13.31
1953 37 -0.09 13.46
1958 32 -0.08 13.31
Note: Cohorts comprise ¯ve years each (labelled by the mid-point). The variable Age refers to the age
of the woman at the moment the census took place. Source: Authors' calculations based on US Census,
several years.
373.5 CPW (a fall of 1.3 CPW) while wives of college-educated husbands decreased fertility
from 2.6 to 1.7 CPW (a reducation of 0.9 CPW). Between the 1908 and the 1933 cohort,
women married to a husband with little schooling increased CEB from 3.5 to 4.4, while if
married to a man with some college, CEB increased from 1.7 to 3.0. It is also interesting
that the baby boom was not completely synchronized across education levels. While for
most education levels the peak occurred in the 1933 cohort, this is not true for very low
levels of education: the highest CEB for wives of men with no schooling was the 1938
cohort and for the 1-4 years of schooling group, this peak was in the 1928 cohort.
In terms of accounting for the overall fertility decline, the ¯tted linear relationship
between CEB and husband's education in years based on the 1868 birth cohort is CEB =
5:08¡0:17¤EdH. Between the 1868 and 1958 birth cohorts, mean education of husbands
increased from 6.7 years to 13.2. Based on this, using the regression, we would expect
mean CEB to fall by 1.1 CPW. In fact, it fell by 1.9, so that about 60% of the observed
change can be accounted for by the increase in mean education of husbands.
In sum then, the CEB/Education data paints a similar picture to that seen with CEB
vs. OIS. The relationship is typically downward sloping and signi¯cantly so. A large
fraction of the time series variation in fertility is consistent with the view that there is
a constant (linear), time invariant relationship between fertility and years of schooling
and that the observed time patterns of fertility correspond to a movement outward (i.e.,
an increase in the level of schooling for everyone) along this ¯xed relationship. There
are also signi¯cant deviations from this however. It is clear from Figure 13 that there is
much more of a downward shift in the curve in CEB vs. Education than there was with
income. For example, CEB for women of husbands with eight years of education fell by
approximately one CPW over the 100 years we analyze. This quantity is similar at other
levels of education as well.42
4.2.1 Husbands vs. Wives
We now analyze the joint relationship between fertility and the level of schooling both of
the husband and the wife in a married couple. We divided the individual records into a grid
of combinations of years of education for wives and husbands. For each combination and
each birth cohort, we calculated mean CEB. For these basic observations, we estimated
42This masks the possibility that there have been changes in the quality of a year of schooling over the
time range studied, a very likely possibility.
38relationships of the form:43
CEBit = ¯0t + ¯EdWt ¤ EdWit + ¯EdHt ¤ EdHit + ¯EdW¤EdWt ¤ EdWit ¤ EdHit + "it:
We included a cross term since, in the data, it is apparent that the higher is a woman's
education the less sensitive is her fertility level to her husband's education (and vice versa).
Table 3 summarizes the results of regressions of the mean values of CEB, averaged in
a cell, on education of both the husband and wife. In each cohort regression, we see that
CEB is declining in both the education level of the wife and the husband, and signi¯cantly
so.44 Note that the coe±cients of husband's and wife's education are similar in size (the
wife's being slightly larger) and that there is no systematic time trend.
To give a sense of the size of these coe±cient estimates, take say 1948, in which the
coe±cient on wife's education is -0.15. This means that, other things equal, the di®erence
in fertility of a couple in which the wife has completed college and one that has only
completed high school is about 0.6 children. Because of positive assortative mating, the
e®ect is even larger actually.
Notice that for most birth cohorts the cross term has a positive coe±cient. This
means that, other things equal, a higher education of the husband implies that the fertility
decision is less sensitive to the number of years of education of the wife (and vice versa).
Also note that the coe±cient sizes are smaller, but that the units are di®erent for this
variable since it is years2. Interestingly, we ¯nd a negative cross-term for some of the early
cohorts (1868, 1873, 1878, 1888). That is, during this time period, a higher education of
the husband implied that fertility was more sensitive to the wife's education.
Temporally, we see that in the period between the baby bust and baby boom, fertility
became more sensitive to years of education of both wives and husbands with the indi-
vidual coe±cients increasing from about 0.10 to 0.20. After that, they returned to their
earlier levels.
These regression results can be used to carry out an accounting exercise much like
those conducted above. Note that mean education of women increases from 6.7 to 13.2
years, while that of their husbands increased from 6.5 to 13.3 from the 1868 to the 1958
birth cohort. Using the regression results from the 1883 birth cohort45, we would expect
43Following the same approach as before, we ran this regression on 9 £ 9 = 81 \observations", where
each observation is average CEB of a combination of husband's and wife's level of schooling.
44The two exceptions to this are the 1868 and 1888 birth cohorts, where CEB is declining in the
education of the wife, but increasing in the education of the husband.
45We use 1883 because this is the ¯rst year, where all regression coe±cients have the same sign as in
all the later periods.
39Table 3: Regression Coe±cients: CEB on Education
Cohort Age ¯EdW ¯EdH ¯EdH¤EdW
1868 72 -0.07 0.14 -0.017
1873 67 -0.10 -0.03 -0.007
1878 62 -0.12 -0.05 -0.001
1883 57 -0.14 -0.18 0.008
1888 52 -0.08 0.09 -0.014
1893 47 -0.16 -0.14 0.007
1898 42 -0.12 -0.06 0.0004
1903 57 -0.15 -0.10 0.005
1908 52 -0.17 -0.16 0.010
1913 47 -0.19 -0.21 0.015
1918 42 -0.23 -0.19 0.015
1923 47 -0.20 -0.16 0.012
1928 42 -0.16 -0.14 0.008
1933 47 -0.14 -0.13 0.005
1938 42 -0.14 -0.19 0.008
1943 47 -0.12 -0.09 0.003
1948 42 -0.15 -0.11 0.006
1958 32 -0.11 -0.07 0.003
Note: Cohorts comprise ¯ve years each (labelled by the mid-point). The variable Age refers to the age
of the woman at the moment the census took place. Source: Authors' calculations based on US Census,
several years.
40CEB to fall by 6:5 ¤ 0:14 + 6:8 ¤ 0:18 ¡ 132 ¤ 0:08 = 1:08 CPW over this time period. In
fact fertility during this time period fell by 1.9 CPW. In this sense, 57% of the observed
decline in fertility can be accounted for by increases in education.
Summarizing, we ¯nd that contrary to other studies (e.g. Hotz and Miller (1988),
Heckman and Walker (1990) using Swedish data, Fleisher and Rhodes (1979) and Mer-
rigan and St. Pierre (1998) for Canada), the negative relationship between fertility and
husband's education is still present when wife's education is also controlled for in the
analysis. Each of these has a separate and signi¯cant impact on fertility. Moreover, we
¯nd a signi¯cant and regular `cross e®ect' { that increases in education have a lesser e®ect
when the partner is more educated.
5 Other `Cuts' on the Data on Fertility
In the previous sections we have examined the overall history of fertility in the US over
the last 150 years, traced the major events of this history { the Fertility Decline, the Baby
Bust of the 1930's, the Baby Boom of the 1950's and the more recent, steady decline in
fertility. We have seen that these basic phenomena have occurred, and with similar timing,
among all the main subgroups of the US population { Urban, Rural, Farm, Non-Farm,
Black, White, Immigrant, Second Generation, Native Born, New Englanders, etc.
We have also documented how these basic events were related to economic variables {
occupation and education. What the analysis by income shows is that the uniformity of
the overall pattern of decline masks an interesting phenomenon. This is that this decline
was not `even' across the income distribution. Indeed, rather than a slow steady and
uniform decline for all income types at the same rate, this decline ¯rst occurred among
the upper incomes and then, later, and more rapidly for the lower incomes. This di®erence
in timing caused an initial spreading, in levels, of fertility from the top to the bottom,
and similarly, a non-monotonicity of estimated income elasticities of demand for children.
In this section, we look into these patterns further and address the following questions.
Are elasticities in groups over the entire time period the same as elasticities for everyone
over the entire time period? We ¯nd that they are not the same, but surprisingly similar.
We ask to what extent the observed di®erences in fertility levels across groups (e.g. by
race) are consistent with one overall relationship between fertility and income, but di®er-
ences across the groups in income. Finally, we investigate whether the overall patterns
by income described above { ¯rst a widening then a reduction in di®erences { are present
within each subgroup.
415.1 Overall CEB vs. Occupational Income for SubGroups
The strong, negative relationship between OI and CEB holds for all cuts on the data
described above { urban/rural, farm/non-farm, black/white, immigrant/non-immigrant
and by region of the country. We examine this relationship in this section both graphically
and through the estimation of income elasticities of demand for children by groups.
We ¯nd that the income elasticities for the various groups are surprisingly similar to
the overall elasticity of -0.38, ranging from -0.24 to -0.48, see Table 4. Each row in this
table describes the result of estimating an income elasticity (i.e., a regression of log(CEB)
on log(OI)) for a particular subgroup of the population, using data from the entire sample
period covered. Note that this period of coverage (generally the birth cohorts between
1828 and 1958) is di®erent for immigrant status because of data availability. The ¯rst two
columns of the table give the intercept and slope, respectively from these regressions. The
fourth column gives the average CEB for each group and the last column is a measure
of how much of the di®erence in CEB can be accounted for exclusively through income
di®erences.
One of the most surprising results in this table is the uniformity between the ur-
ban/rural estimates of slope and intercept. Moreover, these are remarkably close to the
overall estimates. The same statement is true for the farm/non-farm cut of the data.
These two facts are despite the leading role played in the verbal stories for the Fertility
Transition in Demography by both Urbanization and movements o® the farm. What it
suggests is that the observed di®erences in levels of fertility are largely due to di®erences
in income, with both rural and farm areas having lower levels of income.
To get a better idea about how much of the di®erences between groups can be ex-
plained, in an accounting sense, by income di®erences across groups, we added a fourth
column to the table. Using the actual average CEB of a benchmark group (B) for each
cut, the estimated overall elasticity of -0.38, and the actual income gap between a group
and this benchmark group, we calculated a predicted CEB for the remaining cuts.46 The
number reported in the table is the fraction of the actual CEB ratio that is explained
by the predicted CEB ratio. According to this method, we ¯nd that about half of the
di®erence in fertility between urban and rural locations is accounted for by rural areas
being poorer. This result is even more striking when comparing farm and non-farm areas,
where more than 70 percent of the higher fertility on farms is accounted for by the lower
average OI.






42Table 4: Income Elasticity of CEB by Groups
Group Intercept Income OI CEB CEB gap explained
Elasticity by income gap¤¤
All 4.82 -0.38 15,050 3.57
By Location
Urban 4.42 -0.35 13,263 3.21 B
Rural 4.36 -0.33 17,307 3.94 46%
Farm 4.65 -0.36 10,258 4.28 71%
Non-Farm 4.46 -0.33 16,863 3.30 B
By Race
Black 5.29 -0.42 11,343 4.52 42%
White 4.71 -0.37 15,339 3.49 B
By Immigration Status¤
Foreign Born¤ 5.78 -0.48 11,978 4.06 none¤¤¤
US born, Foreign Parents¤ 5.05 -0.41 12,640 3.66 80%
US born, US parents¤ 4.88 -0.39 11,411 3.84 B
By Region
New England 3.42 -0.24 16,242 3.05 B
East North Central 4.26 -0.32 15,280 3.42 19%
South Atlantic 5.60 -0.45 13,870 3.41 52%
West South Central 5.39 -0.43 13,685 4.25 17%
¤ Immigration status is available only for the cohorts between 1828 and 1928.
¤¤ relative to benchmark (B) category.
¤¤¤ Foreign born Americans have higher incomes and higher fertility than US born, US parents.
43The relationship between OI and CEB for whites is very similar to the overall popu-
lation. This is not surprising, given that whites make up 85-95 percent of the population
during this time period. One result that is clear from our estimated relationship between
OI and fertility is that the fertility gap between whites and blacks is not just due to
income (Table A8 in Appendix B gives the estimated cohort elasticities by race). This is
also evident from column 4 in the table, which ¯nds that based on the estimated elasticity,
42% of the one-child di®erence in CPW between black and whites (i.e. about half a child)
is due to income di®erences.
This ¯nding is also re°ected in the table by the di®erences in the constant terms {
5.29 for blacks vs. 4.71 for whites. To get some idea of the magnitude of this di®erence,
note that it implies that if the estimated elasticities for the two races were the same, then
at every level of income, blacks would have, on average, exp(5.29)/exp(4.71)=1.77 times
as many CPW over the sample period. Since the elasticity estimate for blacks is higher
in absolute value than that for whites and the average incomes are di®erent in the two
groups, this overstates the actual di®erence however. In fact, since the intercept is larger
for blacks and the elasticity is also larger, it follows that, on average, low income blacks
have more children than low income whites, but that the reverse is true for high incomes.
It is because blacks had lower incomes on average over the period that this is consistent
with overall fertility being higher for blacks. (Note that this also depends on the location
of mean incomes of the groups relative to the intersection point of the two ¯tted lines.)
As is the case with race, the di®erences in intercepts by place of birth, foreign vs.
native, re°ects the overall higher level of fertility for foreign born compared with native
women. Second generation mothers, on the other hand, have on average fewer children
than Americans with native parents.47 Again, this di®erence in intercepts shows that the
di®erence is not solely due to di®erences in income. Somewhat surprising is the fact that
the demand for children by foreigners is more income sensitive than the other two groups.
The relationship between income and fertility is downward sloping in all of the regions
of the country that we study. Conditioning on income, the regional di®erences are not
that large (roughly half a child). Relative to New England, we ¯nd that between 17%
and 52% of the CEB gap can be accounted for by income di®erences. On the °ip side,
this also leaves a lot of room for \regional ¯xed e®ects." Note that of all the cuts in the
data, the one done by region shows the biggest di®erences across groups. This is true of
both the intercepts, ranging from a high of 5.60 for the South Atlantic region to a low
of 3.42 for New England, and for the income elasticities { roughly in line with modern
47Starting with the 1928 birth cohorts, this trend has reversed.
44levels for the country as a whole (in the -0.2 to -0.3 range) for New England and the East
North Central regions and much higher (around -0.4) for both the South Atlantic and
West South Central regions. Thus, although both the SA and WSC regions were poorer
overall throughout most of the sample period, this income di®erence alone does not seem
to be the source of the fertility di®erences between North and South, or East and West.
5.2 Compression
As documented in the previous section, there was at ¯rst a widening of CEB across
income (1828-1898 birth cohorts), then a compression until the 1923 cohort, after which
the gap in CEB between the top and bottom half of the income distribution stabilized at
about 0.25 CPW. One hypothesis about this compression in fertility is that it is due to
compositional e®ects with respect to some other variate with no conditional compression.
For example, it might be that within both the urban and rural populations no compression
has occurred, but that a larger and larger fraction of the population is located in lower
fertility, urban areas. In principle, changes over time like this could be responsible for
both the overall decline in fertility and the observed compression. Other alternatives
include the racial make-up of the population, the geographic distribution of the population
and the immigrant and non-immigrant fractions. We explore these possibilities in this
section. As a rule, we ¯nd that this pattern over time across the income distribution also
holds within the smaller groups although there is considerably more noise and one or two
notable exceptions. Most striking is the fact that in addition to the overall compression
in fertility between mean CEBs across groups (as discussed in Section 3), there has also
been a compression of CEB across income deciles within most groups. That is, not only
has mean fertility of blacks become more similar to that of whites, it is also true that the
di®erence in fertility between the top and bottom income levels for blacks and whites has
converged (i.e., the average slope in levels). This is true for all of the other cuts of the
data we examined as well. In sum, these di®erent groups are looking more and more alike
in their fertility behavior over time, both in terms of the overall averages, and in the way
person by person di®erences in the group vary with income.
Following the analysis in Section 4, we again compute two measures of the sensitivity
of fertility to income. First, we compute income elasticities group by group for all cohorts
and secondly, we computed the di®erences in fertility between the top and bottom half of
the income distribution for each cohort for each sub-group.
The estimated income elasticities give an overall similar, but much noisier picture,
45especially in the ¯rst half of the time period under consideration. Note that some groups
make up only a small fraction of the population (e.g. blacks 15%), which brings down the
sample size by a large factor. In some cases, this results in estimated elasticities changing
substantially from cohort to cohort.
Since whites constitute between 85% and 95% of the population during this time
period, it is not surprising that the estimated elasticities for whites follow closely those
of the overall population (see Table A8 in the Appendix). Average CEB of black women
also experienced a widening at ¯rst followed by a compression. However, the decline in
elasticities started later and was slower, so that the stabilization at around -0.20 did not
occur until the peak of the baby boom (birth cohort 1933), compared to 1918 for the
overall population. Similarly, while the di®erence in CEB between the bottom and top
half had already fallen well below 0.5 for whites by the 1913 cohort, this did not happen
until 1928 for blacks.
The time series of our estimated elasticities for the four regions under consideration
is also in parallel with the overall trend: ¯rst a widening then a compression of CEB
by income. What is interesting is that New England, the region with the lowest fertility
overall, and the lowest elasticity of CEB across income, also experienced the earliest
income compression. Elasticities fell below -0.2 already by the 1908 cohort in that part
of the country, while in the overall data this did not occur until the 1928 cohort. West
South Central, on the other hand, experienced fertility highly sensitive to income until
very recently, and only with the 1958 cohort reached a level of -0.22. Figure A7 in the
Appendix shows the compression within regions as measured by the di®erence in CEB of
the bottom to top half of the income distribution. This picture, though noisy, is quite
striking. It shows that the size of the top to bottom widening in fertility that occurred in
the late 19th century di®ered greatly by region, and was much larger in the West South
Central and South Atlantic regions than it was in the Northeastern part of the country.
For example, the gap from top to bottom was around 0.15 children in New England and
the East North Central areas in the period between the 1825 and 1845 cohorts, much
less than the overall gap of about 0.8 children, and about 0.65 in the South Atlantic and
West South Central regions. Between the 1855 and 1900 cohorts, this gap had increased
to about 1.35 in the south and west and only to about 0.63 in the north and east. Thus,
the change was about 0.7 CPW in the SA and WSC and a bit more than half as much in
NE and the ENC regions. As a point of comparison, overall this gap increased to about
1.2 CPW, about the same as in the SA and WSC.48 By the 1958 birth cohort, the size of
48The average gaps between the 1828 and 1843 cohorts were .12 for NE, .23 for the ENC, .54 for the
46this gap had converged to about 0.25 CPW in all regions of the country.
Whether women are born in the United States or abroad, or are second generation
immigrants, matters a lot for fertility choice, as we have seen in Section 3. As Table 4
shows, the fertility decision of foreign born women is most sensitive to income. This was
not always the case, however. We ¯nd that the widening of CEB across incomes occurred
for foreign born women did not occur until 1868, compared to 1838 for the overall group.
The compression, as measured by a decline in the estimated elasticity, had begun among
foreign born women by 1883, about 15 years before this occurred with women as a whole.
American-born women with native parents, on the other hand, experienced very elastic
fertility already as early as 1848, with values ranging between -0.4 and -0.5 between
1848 and 1908, when the compression started very rapidly mirroring the observed overall
compression. The experience of second generation Americans lies somewhere in between.
In our analysis of urban vs. rural households, we again ¯nd a widening at ¯rst and
then a compression of CEB across income. However, the compression both for rural and
urban households is much milder than the overall compression. The average gap of CEB
between the top and bottom half of the income distribution narrowed from 0.7 to 0.4 for
rural households and from 0.5 to 0.2 for urban households, compared to an overall decline
in the gap from 1 to 0.3. This is even more striking when comparing farm and non-farm
households, where until 1913 the top to bottom di®erence for each group is substantially
below the overall top to bottom di®erence (0.6 for urban, 0.1 for rural and 1.0 overall ).
These numbers suggest that at least part of the observed pattern, a spreading followed
by compression, is due to the movements from rural to urban (resp. farm to non-farm)
locations of the population at large.
An interesting observation is that the relative CEB for richer vs. poorer households
narrowed substantially between 1883 and 1913 for urban households (from 0.7 to 0.17),
but did not compress at all during this time period for rural households (roughly stable
around 0.7). This can be seen in Figure 14. These results are also apparent from our
elasticity estimates, where we ¯nd generally much lower values for urban women between
1908 and 1933 { see Table A8 in Appendix B.
The farm/non-farm cut on the data is one place in which the overall pattern of ¯rst
a widening of fertility from top to bottom, then a contraction, is not seen. The top to
bottom spread among the farm group itself increased monotonically over time. This seems
to have more to do with a signi¯cant widening of the `occupation spread' over time than
SA and .74 for the WSC. The averages between the 1863 to 1898 cohorts were .61 for NE and .65 for the
ENC, and 1.44 for the SA and 1.25 for the WSC.
47Figure 14: CEB gap top and bottom half, urban vs. rural

























anything else{ viz., early on almost everyone who lived on a farm was a farmer and hence,
had the same OI, while now, even though a much smaller fraction of the population reports
living on a farm, the range of occupations listed is much wider. This by itself causes the
top to bottom di®erential for households living on farms to increase independent of any
other shifts over time.
In sum, we ¯nd that women in di®erent parts of the income distribution have become
more similar to each other in their fertility behavior for birth cohorts since the turn of
the century. We ¯nd that this general compression of fertility of women with respect
to income holds conditional on many characteristics { race, geography, and whether the
women are immigrants or not.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have used data from the US Census to document the major fertility
patterns in the US for women born between 1826 and 1960 and relate them to measures
of economic well-being.
We have found that in each cohort there is a strong negative correlation between
48fertility level of a woman and a measure of her wealth proxied by husband's occupation,
Adjusted Occupational Income. Overall, the wealth elasticity of demand for children is
estimated to be -0.38 for the period. We ¯nd that much of the di®erence in fertility
experiences (e.g. over time, and between groups such as blacks and whites and between
regions) can be accounted for by di®erences in income alone. However, we also document
that a single, simple, isoelastic relationship between wealth and fertility misses some key
and, we think, interesting features of the data. Among these are:
1. An increased spread in fertility from top to bottom of the income distribution be-
tween the 1828 and 1898 birth cohorts, or, related, an increase in the wealth elasticity
of demand for children over this period (in absolute value);
2. A dramatic compression in fertility levels with respect to wealth that took place
primarily during the Baby Bust of the 1930's and the Baby Boom of the 1950's;
3. A resulting overall pattern through which the Fertility Transition seems to have
begun early and taken place gradually among the upper income families and began
later and was much quicker for lower income families;
4. The sensitivity of fertility to income was in place well before married women began
participating in the labor market in any signi¯cant number;
5. The patterns identi¯ed in 1 through 4 above occurred in a widespread fashion, across
races, regions of the country, in both urban and rural areas and by place of birth of
the mother;
6. Overall, as a result of these facts, modern fertility in the US is compressed { it
varies little by income (the estimated elasticity of the last cohorts are lower than
they have ever been), by race or by other key demographic factors.
Although these facts are of considerable interest to researchers doing quantitative
studies in positive theories of fertility choice, there is still much more that could be done.
Throughout, we have focused only on marital fertility, a restriction that has become more
and more important in recent years. Although a useful and interesting starting point, our
use of occupational income leaves much to be desired. Occupation is only a weak proxy
for true economic wealth for a variety of reasons, and even given those short-comings we
do not have adequate data to perfectly map the implications for changes over time on the
wealth of even an average worker in an occupational class. Moreover, due to the fact that
49occupation data was not collected for individuals not in the labor force until recently, we
were restricted to using only husband's occupation in this study. To do more would have
required handling the serious sample selection bias issues that arise when some women
work and others don't. These issues are present here too of course, but we think that the
¯ndings are of su±cient interest even given these limitations to be useful to researchers.
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A Methodology
The data used throughout this paper is based on a 1% public use sample of the U.S.
Census data, made available from the Minnesota Population Center at www.ipums.org
(Ruggles et al 2004). We are interested in average fertility by cohorts of women. We
de¯ne a cohort to be ¯ve years of birth years. Data on some cohorts is available from
multiple censuses. For example, one could get information on the 1900 cohort by looking
at 50 year old women in 1950 or 60 year old women in 1960, etc. Our goal was to use
women who have already completed their child-bearing years, but are still young enough
for selection not to be a big problem. We therefore chose to focus on 40-50 year olds.
We supplement this with data from older and sometimes younger women to extend the
time series backward and forward when necessary. Similarly, we use di®erent ages to ¯ll
in missing cohorts due to the lack of fertility information in the 1920 and 1930 censuses.
For any given cohort, we used ages as close as possible to (but older than) 50-60. We used
information on 30-40 year old women to extend the time series by two additional cohorts,
but these last two data points should be treated with caution, since not all women in
this group will have completed their fertility. This methodology led us to the age-census
combinations that are summarized in Table A1.
For each cohort, the mean number of children ever born (CEB) was derived by com-
puting the weighted49 average of CEB for all women in that cohort who are married when
answering the census survey. Moreover, we included only women whose husbands have a
valid occupational income score.
For some of the variables, we have to deviate from the age/cohort selections described
in Table A1 because data is not available for all pairs. The modi¯cations are as follows.
Information on urban vs. rural is not available in the 1940 and 1950 census. Thus, all
49The weights are provided in the census data and are needed to correct for over-sampling of certain
populations in some years.
58Table A1: Census Year and Age Group used for Each Cohort
Birth Cohort Cohort Label Age Census Year CEB
1816-1820 1818 80-84 1900 4.99
1821-1825 1823 75-79 1900 6.07
1826-1830 1828 70-74 1900 5.46
1831-1835 1833 65-69 1900 5.40
1836-1840 1838 60-64 1900 5.50
1841-1845 1843 55-59 1900 5.36
1846-1850 1848 50-54 1900 5.34
1851-1855 1853 45-49 1900 5.27
1856-1860 1858 40-44 1900 4.88
1861-1865 1863 45-49 1910 4.92
1866-1870 1868 40-44 1910 4.48
1871-1875 1873 65-69 1940 3.53
1876-1880 1878 60-64 1940 3.31
1881-1885 1883 55-59 1940 3.25
1886-1890 1888 50-54 1940 3.17
1891-1895 1893 45-49 1940 3.05
1896-1900 1898 40-44 1940 2.83
1901-1905 1903 45-49 1950 2.60
1906-1910 1908 40-44 1950 2.30
1911-1915 1913 45-49 1960 2.41
1916-1920 1918 40-44 1960 2.59
1921-1925 1923 45-49 1970 2.85
1926-1930 1928 40-44 1970 3.11
1931-1935 1933 45-49 1980 3.21
1936-1940 1938 40-44 1980 3.02
1941-1945 1943 45-49 1990 2.56
1946-1950 1948 40-44 1990 2.22
1951-1955 1953 35-39 1990 2.05
1956-1960 1958 30-35 1990 1.81
Note: CEB designates the average number of Children ever Born per woman per cohort. Census year
indicates the date on which the census that is used as source for the calculations took place. The age
refers to the age of the women when the census took place. Source: Authors' calculations based on US
Census, several years.
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cohorts that are based on information from these two censuses in the main data need to be
derived from a di®erent age/census combination for information on urban/rural fertility.
We use instead the 1960 census, and respectively older ages. Moreover, we excluded the
1873 cohort entirely. The modi¯cations we made for the urban/rural Sub-Groups are
listed in Table A2.
Information on immigration is not available in the 1980 and 1990 census. Thus, we
used only the cohorts between 1828 and 1928 reported in Table A1. We added one
additional cohort by looking at 35-39 year old women in the 1970 census, which allows us
to include the 1933 cohort, the peak of the baby boom.
Similarly, education data is not available for all years because information on education
was collected beginning only with the 1940 census. The 1950 census data has information
on education only on one (randomly drawn) person in a household, which means that
there is never information on both spouses simultaneously. We therefore had to make
some replacements for the 1903 and 1908 cohorts as well. The age/cohort combinations
used for the education analysis are listed in Table A3.
For any calculations based on OIS deciles, we always compute the deciles ¯rst within
each group (i.e. age/cohort or age/cohort/race etc.) and then calculate means of all
observations that do not have a missing CEB entry. That is, we make no correction for
any bias in answering these questions.
The income elasticities reported are regression coe±cients from the following regres-
sions:
log(CEBit) = b0t + b1t log(OIit) + ²it
where each observation it is an average of all women with husbands in the i-th decile of
60Table A3: Cohorts for Education Data
cohort age census year cohort age census year
1868 72 1940 1918 42 1960
1873 67 1940 1923 47 1970
1878 62 1940 1928 42 1970
1883 57 1940 1933 47 1980
1888 52 1940 1938 42 1980
1893 47 1940 1943 47 1990
1898 42 1940 1948 42 1990
1903 57 1960 1953 37 1990
1908 52 1960 1958 32 1990
1913 47 1960
the occupational income distribution in year t. We run this regression based on averages
rather than individual observations both because this approach allows us to handle the
10-20% of women with zero children and also because OIit is likely to su®er from errors
in variables. This methodology seems reasonable given that we are more interested in
planned fertility than realized fertility.
B Additional Data
61Table A4: CEB by Decile, all Cohorts
Cohort D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
1828 5.42 6.22 6.22 6.22 6.22 5.89 5.88 4.96 4.77 4.07
1833 6.20 5.83 5.83 5.83 5.83 5.63 5.09 4.70 5.03 4.51
1838 5.57 5.94 5.94 5.94 5.94 5.46 5.49 4.93 5.18 4.57
1843 5.72 5.79 5.79 5.79 5.73 5.51 5.12 5.29 4.85 4.32
1848 5.72 6.12 6.12 6.12 5.83 5.36 4.80 4.81 4.55 4.12
1853 6.07 6.12 6.12 6.12 5.50 5.15 4.99 4.87 4.35 3.71
1858 5.69 5.69 5.69 5.69 4.84 4.51 4.61 4.59 4.01 3.69
1863 5.66 5.97 5.97 5.93 5.22 4.29 4.39 4.35 4.10 3.78
1868 5.19 5.47 5.47 4.92 4.61 4.20 4.11 4.00 3.56 3.44
1873 3.96 4.20 4.20 3.76 3.45 3.13 3.26 2.73 2.84 2.61
1878 3.84 4.13 4.13 3.62 3.17 3.12 2.83 2.77 2.42 2.45
1883 4.20 4.18 3.93 3.62 3.17 2.81 2.72 2.51 2.61 2.41
1888 3.99 4.04 3.51 3.80 3.03 2.88 2.90 2.54 2.49 2.32
1893 3.95 3.99 3.38 3.26 2.98 2.89 2.81 2.43 2.47 2.32
1898 3.76 4.07 3.12 2.83 2.66 2.57 2.53 2.43 2.22 2.04
1903 3.52 3.14 2.78 2.64 2.46 2.41 2.55 2.28 2.12 1.96
1908 3.14 2.72 2.46 2.37 2.25 2.25 2.23 2.04 1.77 1.79
1913 3.27 2.68 2.46 2.36 2.36 2.38 2.33 2.13 2.04 2.05
1918 3.28 2.83 2.64 2.56 2.51 2.57 2.48 2.37 2.33 2.36
1923 3.30 3.01 2.98 2.73 2.83 2.88 2.70 2.66 2.67 2.72
1928 3.54 3.33 3.21 3.04 3.12 3.11 3.02 2.91 2.89 2.92
1933 3.49 3.41 3.22 3.31 3.20 3.21 3.10 3.07 2.98 2.97
1938 3.35 3.24 3.02 3.18 3.04 3.02 2.89 2.88 2.77 2.73
1943 2.89 2.76 2.56 2.65 2.57 2.53 2.41 2.37 2.37 2.35
1948 2.48 2.46 2.23 2.28 2.29 2.12 2.14 2.07 2.06 2.05
1953 2.27 2.20 2.05 2.12 2.08 2.02 1.98 1.94 1.91 1.89
1958 2.03 1.99 1.86 1.87 1.83 1.78 1.74 1.66 1.67 1.58
Note: Each cohort groups ¯ve years, and its label is the mid-point (See Table 4). D1 ...D10 refers to
deciles which are calculated based on Occupational Income as de¯ned in Section 4.1. Source: Authors'
calculations based on US Census, several years.
62Table A5: Income Elasticities of CEB by Birth Cohorts
Cohort CEB OI Elasticity
1828 5.59 4154 -0.33
1833 5.45 4587 -0.24
1838 5.49 5064 -0.20
1843 5.39 5591 -0.22
1848 5.36 6173 -0.32
1853 5.30 6816 -0.38
1858 4.90 7525 -0.35
1863 4.97 8308 -0.35
1868 4.50 9173 -0.34
1873 3.41 10128 -0.37
1878 3.25 11182 -0.42
1883 3.22 12346 -0.47
1888 3.15 13631 -0.45
1893 3.05 15050 -0.44
1898 2.82 16616 -0.50
1903 2.59 18345 -0.41
1908 2.30 20255 -0.42
1913 2.41 22363 -0.35
1918 2.59 24690 -0.25
1923 2.85 27260 -0.17
1928 3.11 30097 -0.17
1933 3.20 33230 -0.16
1938 3.01 36688 -0.19
1943 2.54 40507 -0.21
1948 2.22 44723 -0.20
1953 2.05 49378 -0.17
1958 1.80 54517 -0.22
Note: CEB indicates average Children ever Born and OI is average Occupational Income per cohort.
Cohorts comprise ¯ve years each (labelled by the mid-point), and the construction of the variable OI is
described in Section 4.1. The income elasticity is estimated with a log-log regression of CEB on OI where
each observation corresponds to the average CEB and OI of an income decile within the cohort. Source:
Authors' calculations based on US Census, several years.
63Table A6: Average CEB by Cohorts and Sub-Groups
coh. all R U W B NE ENC SA WSC NAT FP FB NF F
1828 5.59 5.92 4.67 5.46 7.12 3.44 5.22 6.46 6.46 5.49 7.24 5.67 4.97 6.09
1833 5.45 5.66 4.98 5.24 7.93 4.21 5.42 6.21 6.79 5.30 5.64 5.72 5.11 5.79
1838 5.49 5.67 5.10 5.36 7.02 4.29 5.45 6.02 6.64 5.34 5.05 5.93 5.07 5.92
1843 5.39 5.59 5.01 5.29 6.64 3.95 5.19 6.07 6.42 5.17 4.87 6.09 5.00 5.81
1848 5.36 5.74 4.73 5.18 7.25 3.66 5.12 6.56 6.82 5.25 4.98 5.75 4.82 6.03
1853 5.30 5.78 4.55 5.14 6.93 4.06 4.89 6.27 6.98 5.21 4.87 5.80 4.70 6.10
1858 4.90 5.38 4.22 4.76 6.50 3.83 4.45 6.16 6.17 4.81 4.55 5.45 4.38 5.68
1863 4.97 5.57 4.29 4.80 6.62 4.06 4.44 6.29 6.61 4.92 4.30 5.62 4.41 5.97
1868 4.50 5.05 3.92 4.37 5.91 3.81 4.05 5.60 5.96 4.48 3.91 5.02 4.07 5.39
1873 3.41 { { 3.29 5.41 3.27 2.69 4.50 4.54 3.38 3.23 3.94 3.02 4.19
1878 3.25 3.62 2.83 3.21 3.93 2.79 2.99 4.28 4.25 3.21 3.07 3.64 2.82 4.19
1883 3.22 3.64 2.71 3.15 4.21 2.88 2.78 4.01 4.23 3.27 2.65 3.66 2.85 4.16
1888 3.15 3.60 2.68 3.11 3.73 3.05 2.97 3.68 3.86 3.12 2.93 3.53 2.81 4.12
1893 3.05 3.54 2.50 3.01 3.49 2.86 2.89 3.58 3.48 3.02 2.79 3.42 2.76 3.99
1898 2.82 3.31 2.30 2.78 3.21 2.61 2.72 3.33 3.17 2.93 2.55 2.80 2.48 4.04
1903 2.59 3.17 2.15 2.56 2.87 2.49 2.48 2.97 2.82 2.69 2.40 2.44 2.35 3.73
1908 2.30 3.00 2.07 2.26 2.78 2.11 2.25 2.60 2.43 2.40 2.09 2.19 2.12 3.36
1913 2.41 2.99 2.14 2.36 2.92 2.30 2.37 2.57 2.62 2.50 2.18 2.24 2.31 3.23
1918 2.59 3.11 2.37 2.55 3.04 2.43 2.59 2.71 2.82 2.68 2.38 2.38 2.51 3.41
1923 2.85 3.24 2.71 2.80 3.43 2.85 2.90 2.81 2.96 2.92 2.68 2.57 2.81 3.45
1928 3.11 3.41 2.99 3.04 3.86 3.10 3.19 3.04 3.26 3.17 3.00 2.77 3.08 3.67
1933 3.20 3.37 3.12 3.14 3.92 3.25 3.36 3.01 3.27 3.20 3.08 2.78 3.18 3.55
1938 3.01 3.14 2.96 2.96 3.61 2.99 3.11 2.84 3.17 { { { 3.00 3.29
1943 2.54 2.68 2.49 2.52 2.86 2.48 2.61 2.40 2.65 { { { 2.53 2.94
1948 2.22 2.31 2.18 2.19 2.54 2.11 2.29 2.10 2.33 { { { 2.21 2.57
1953 2.05 2.13 2.01 2.03 2.28 1.89 2.11 1.91 2.18 { { { 2.04 2.45
1958 1.80 1.94 1.75 1.79 1.97 1.65 1.87 1.67 1.90 { { { 1.79 2.33
Note: Cohorts comprise ¯ve years each (labelled by the mid-point). CEB=Children ever born, R=Rural,
U=Urban, W=White, B=Black, NE=New England, ENC=East North Central, SA=South Atlantic,
WSC=West South Central, NAT=U.S. born, U.S. parents, FP=U.S. born, foreign parents, FB=Foreign
born, NF=Non-Farm, F=Farm. Source: Authors' calculations based on US Census, several years.
64Table A7: Fertility Gap between Bottom and Top Half of the Income Distribution by
Cohorts and Sub-Groups
Coh. all R U W B NE ENC SA WSC NAT FP FB NF F
1828 0.95 0.46 0.23 0.87 0.86 -0.09 0.19 0.33 0.59 1.16 -1.39 0.57 1.26 -0.08
1833 0.91 0.64 0.76 0.71 1.06 0.75 0.29 1.32 0.64 1.26 0.14 0.48 0.69 0.13
1838 0.74 0.39 0.32 0.62 -0.12 0.00 -0.21 0.13 1.18 0.80 1.03 0.29 0.38 0.08
1843 0.74 0.48 0.56 0.64 0.78 0.27 0.20 0.39 0.52 0.94 -0.43 0.81 0.56 0.00
1848 1.26 0.60 0.66 1.07 1.01 0.89 0.60 0.89 1.24 1.57 0.89 0.50 0.67 0.15
1853 1.37 0.74 0.77 1.22 1.51 0.66 0.70 1.70 0.99 1.81 0.67 0.83 0.82 0.14
1858 1.24 0.65 0.46 1.10 1.55 0.00 0.77 1.24 1.05 1.68 0.63 0.51 0.59 0.05
1863 1.57 0.81 0.43 1.24 1.88 0.40 0.94 1.59 1.88 1.95 0.67 0.64 0.56 0.22
1868 1.27 0.77 0.62 1.11 1.31 0.55 0.77 1.27 1.73 1.76 0.95 0.43 0.75 0.13
1873 1.00 { { 0.82 0.46 0.52 0.35 1.88 0.24 1.34 0.47 0.83 0.60 0.01
1878 1.06 1.56 0.30 0.98 1.15 0.70 0.55 1.63 0.97 1.39 0.63 1.00 0.56 0.00
1883 1.21 0.53 0.70 1.11 2.04 1.25 0.74 1.57 1.51 1.23 0.98 1.37 0.71 0.09
1888 1.05 0.71 0.41 0.99 1.28 0.97 0.91 0.96 1.11 1.16 0.99 0.85 0.64 0.11
1893 0.93 0.71 0.51 0.87 1.79 0.54 0.45 1.18 1.46 0.98 0.63 0.87 0.56 0.25
1898 0.93 0.77 0.36 0.90 0.46 -0.02 0.53 1.42 1.07 1.05 0.60 0.61 0.42 0.14
1903 0.64 0.72 0.40 0.61 1.01 0.41 0.28 0.98 0.91 0.71 0.41 0.47 0.32 0.18
1908 0.57 0.73 0.29 0.54 0.49 0.00 0.51 0.83 0.71 0.63 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.09
1913 0.44 0.69 0.17 0.39 0.62 0.14 0.24 0.68 0.71 0.51 0.22 0.43 0.30 0.34
1918 0.34 0.56 0.11 0.28 0.71 -0.03 0.14 0.59 0.72 0.41 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.30
1923 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.18 0.48 0.04 0.11 0.52 0.49 0.31 0.02 0.20 0.21 0.13
1928 0.27 0.50 0.16 0.19 0.27 0.01 0.17 0.45 0.66 0.32 0.12 0.29 0.25 0.24
1933 0.26 0.34 0.21 0.18 0.47 0.11 0.20 0.33 0.46 0.29 0.18 0.36 0.24 0.23
1938 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.37 0.45 { { { 0.30 0.42
1943 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.36 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.45 { { { 0.28 0.10
1948 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.41 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.38 { { { 0.26 0.24
1953 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.30 { { { 0.19 0.47
1958 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.22 { { { 0.23 0.19
Note: The fertility gap is calculated as the di®erence in average Children ever Born (CEB) between the
bottom and top half of the income distribution, where income is measured according to Occupational
Income (OI) as described in Section 4.1. Cohorts comprise ¯ve years each (labelled by the mid-point).
R=Rural, U=Urban, W=White, B=Black, NE=New England, ENC=East North Central, SA=South
Atlantic, WSC=West South Central, NAT=U.S. born, U.S. parents, FP= U.S. born, foreign parents,
FB=Foreign born, NF=Non-Farm, F=Farm. Source: Authors' calculations based on US Census, several
years.
65Table A8: Income Elasticities by Birth Cohort and Sub-Groups
coh. all R U W B NE ENC SA WSC NAT FP FB NF F
1828 -0.33 -0.24 -0.07 -0.29 -0.17 0.51 -0.15 -0.20 -0.27 -0.41 -0.08 -0.21 -0.31 0.06
1833 -0.24 -0.21 -0.22 -0.19 -0.42 -0.20 -0.09 -0.53 -0.36 -0.37 0.08 -0.13 -0.25 -0.20
1838 -0.20 -0.20 -0.11 -0.16 0.11 -0.08 0.02 -0.11 -0.39 -0.26 -0.22 -0.10 -0.05 -0.13
1843 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 -0.23 -0.05 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.25 -0.12 -0.21 -0.21 0.01
1848 -0.32 -0.29 -0.30 -0.28 -0.29 -0.28 -0.16 -0.33 -0.43 -0.46 -0.19 -0.15 -0.23 -0.31
1853 -0.38 -0.31 -0.35 -0.34 -0.42 -0.15 -0.24 -0.59 -0.31 -0.50 -0.27 -0.23 -0.31 -0.21
1858 -0.35 -0.26 -0.28 -0.32 -0.39 -0.23 -0.24 -0.30 -0.26 -0.44 -0.26 -0.20 -0.25 -0.09
1863 -0.35 -0.33 -0.21 -0.30 -0.52 -0.09 -0.23 -0.37 -0.46 -0.49 -0.26 -0.18 -0.20 -0.28
1868 -0.34 -0.27 -0.31 -0.33 -0.32 -0.15 -0.26 -0.27 -0.42 -0.43 -0.34 -0.16 -0.28 -0.28
1873 -0.37 { { -0.33 -0.27 -0.18 -0.17 -0.52 -0.01 -0.42 -0.35 -0.30 -0.32 -0.02
1878 -0.42 -0.46 -0.30 -0.42 -0.52 -0.47 -0.30 -0.54 -0.29 -0.50 -0.28 -0.40 -0.30 -0.02
1883 -0.47 -0.20 -0.44 -0.44 -0.75 -0.75 -0.37 -0.47 -0.44 -0.46 -0.51 -0.50 -0.40 -0.04
1888 -0.45 -0.31 -0.30 -0.44 -0.46 -0.54 -0.43 -0.48 -0.37 -0.49 -0.49 -0.36 -0.38 -0.12
1893 -0.44 -0.29 -0.35 -0.43 -0.63 -0.19 -0.28 -0.54 -0.53 -0.46 -0.39 -0.38 -0.35 -0.21
1898 -0.50 -0.34 -0.33 -0.50 -0.23 -0.10 -0.38 -0.64 -0.39 -0.50 -0.48 -0.44 -0.32 -0.17
1903 -0.41 -0.33 -0.36 -0.41 -0.47 -0.37 -0.30 -0.52 -0.40 -0.42 -0.35 -0.34 -0.27 -0.06
1908 -0.42 -0.37 -0.30 -0.42 -0.29 -0.12 -0.38 -0.48 -0.41 -0.42 -0.37 -0.31 -0.30 -0.11
1913 -0.35 -0.34 -0.17 -0.32 -0.44 -0.16 -0.27 -0.44 -0.44 -0.37 -0.22 -0.31 -0.28 -0.25
1918 -0.25 -0.27 -0.10 -0.22 -0.42 -0.02 -0.15 -0.33 -0.36 -0.27 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20
1923 -0.17 -0.23 -0.09 -0.14 -0.32 -0.05 -0.10 -0.30 -0.25 -0.20 -0.05 -0.15 -0.16 -0.11
1928 -0.17 -0.24 -0.11 -0.13 -0.33 -0.02 -0.13 -0.24 -0.32 -0.19 -0.10 -0.22 -0.16 -0.11
1933 -0.16 -0.18 -0.14 -0.12 -0.23 -0.06 -0.12 -0.21 -0.25 -0.16 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15 -0.10
1938 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.20 -0.15 -0.13 -0.22 -0.27 { { { -0.19 -0.16
1943 -0.21 -0.17 -0.21 -0.19 -0.27 -0.12 -0.15 -0.20 -0.31 { { { -0.21 -0.05
1948 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 -0.28 -0.11 -0.15 -0.19 -0.29 { { { -0.20 -0.13
1953 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.25 { { { -0.16 -0.24
1958 -0.22 -0.18 -0.22 -0.21 -0.25 -0.22 -0.16 -0.23 -0.22 { { { -0.22 -0.11
Note: Cohorts comprise ¯ve years each (labeled by the mid-point). The income elasticity is estimated
with a log-log regression of Children ever Born (CEB) on Occupational Income (OI) where each ob-
servation corresponds to the average CEB and OI of an income decile within the cohort. R=Rural,
U=Urban, W=White, B=Black, NE=New England, ENC=East North Central, SA=South Atlantic,
WSC=West South Central, NAT=U.S. born, U.S. parents, FP=U.S. born, foreign parents, FB=Foreign
born, NF=Non-Farm, F=Farm. Source: Authors' calculations based on US Census, several years.
66C Robustness
Actual income data is available from the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 censuses. Using
the same age-cohort pairs as in the paper, this allows us to construct CEB estimates by
income deciles for the all cohorts between 1913-1958. In line with our previous analysis,
we use information on husband's income only. We employ the variable INCTOT, which
reports each respondent's total pre-tax personal income or losses from all sources for the
previous year. Using current income as an alternative measure of life-time income, we
recompute the fertility gap between the top and bottom halves of the income distribution
and re-estimate the income elasticity of fertility. Figures 15 and 16 compare the new
estimates with the original ones.







































As the ¯gures show, the fertility gap between top and bottom halves of the actual
income distribution fell be an even larger amount between the 1913 and the 1958 cohorts
than the gap as measured by our constructed occupational income. The gap as measured
by current income is a fall of 65% compared to a 50% fall when income is approximated
by OI. Similarly, our estimated income elasticities fall by a large amount from the 1913 to


















































the 1958 cohorts, both when life-time income is proxied by current income (fall of 47%)
and when OI is used as a proxy (fall of 22%).
One thing to note based on Figure 10 is that although the overall pattern of reduced
elasticity is the same in both measures, the elasticities when estimated using current
income are systematically lower. This is somewhat troubling and warrants both further
discussion and further exploration. There are several possible reasons for this ¯nding:
First, there are errors in variables problems in using one year of income data. That
is, what most economic models would say that fertility depends on is the present value of
the entire stream of incomes over the lifetime. Since incomes do vary year to year, using
any one entry from this sequence will be an imperfect measure of true economic wealth
{ it proxies for wealth with error. As is well known, this will bias coe±cient estimates
toward zero. OIS su®ers from similar problems, but is, perhaps, more immune.
A second, related problem is that income changes systematically over the life cycle,
¯rst rising and then falling after reaching a peak at around age 55. Moreover, this pattern
is systematically related to the type of occupation one is in { high paying occupations
have steeper life cycle pro¯les, low paying ones are °atter.50 Because of this, and because
50See Buttet and Schoonbroodt (2005), Figure 34, for evidence on this.
68we are only using data on women who are at least 40 (and their husbands are likely even
older) the one year of income that we use is near the peak of their life cycle earnings.
While this is a good proxy for true wealth for individuals with °at pro¯les (i.e., low income
earners) it is upward biased for individuals with steep pro¯les (i.e., high income earners).
This will also cause the estimates based on current income to be biased down.
These points do not resolve the issue, and it is possible that the estimates based on
occupation are too high. This is clearly an area where more work would be fruitful.
D De¯nitions of Fertility Measures
Demographers use a variety of di®erent measures to summarize the fertility behavior of a
population over time. The most popular measures are the Crude Birth Rate (CBR) and
the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) which is sometimes also known as Period Total Fertility
Rate. These are both point in time estimates of average fertility in a population in that
they are calculated for a given year using only data on fertility from that year.
The CBR is simply the number of children born in a year divided by the number of
women in the population. This measure is useful for studying overall population dynamics
but can be misleading as a measure of fertility. For example, CBR could be low in a given
year either because women of child bearing ages are choosing to have a small number of
children or because there are many women in the population who have already completed
their fertility.
TFR attempts to correct for some of these weaknesses by correcting for the age distri-
bution dependence of CBR. It does this by constructing age dependent fertility rates at
a point in time and then summing them over ages. In this way, if, for example, there is
an unusually large number of women in the population that are not of child bearing age
TFR is una®ected. Formally, let fa;t be the number of children born to women of age a




Note that since this measure uses data from di®erent birth cohorts at a given point in
time (i.e., it mixes cohorts) it will be a misleading measure of actual fertility choices in
periods when fertility is changing from cohort to cohort. Examples include the Fertility
Transition, the Baby Busts and the Baby Boom. If fertility choices are stable across time,
however, TFR gives an accurate measure of the number of children a typical woman will
51Typically these age speci¯c fertility rates are constructed for bands of ages of width 5 years and then
summed. The limits of the sum, a = 15 to a = 49, are the ones usually used.
69have over her life.




This would be a measure of the lifetime fertility experience of the average woman born
in period t (i.e., in the t-th birth cohort). Cohort TFR's are favored by some Demogra-
phers (see Ryder (1969, 1980 and 1986)) for analyzing fertility, but we do not know of
any source that has constructed any long time series of CTFR for the US. The di±culty
is that the census tracks only living people, not actual births, so that in periods in which
infant and child mortality is signi¯cant many births never get counted. Unfortunately,
actual Births and Deaths were not recorded in much of the US until the 1930's.
Other measures of fertility have also been proposed to try and adjust TFR for the fact
that it tracks only a synthetic cohort. These include TFR* (see Bongaarts and Feeney
(1998)) and Average Cohort Fertility (ACF) (see Schoen (2004)).
Completed Fertility (CF) is the number of children that a woman has had when she is
done having children, and, as such, is the measure that is closest to what most economists
have in mind when writing models of fertility choice. One di±culty is that one can never
be completely sure that a woman has completed her fertility, so that age must be used
as a proxy for this. This points to using as high an age as possible, but, if the assumed
completion age is too high a substantial number of women will have died. If age at death
is correlated with fertility choice, this introduces a bias.
The measure that we use, Children Ever Born (CEB), is most closely related to CF
in that it is a self reported measure of CF for those women surveyed. Thus, it su®ers
from the same imperfections that CF does, but is available for a long period and can be
checked for robustness to the choice of completion age by examining its value for the same
birth cohort with data from di®erent censuses.
Another issue that arises is the treatment of women that die during child-bearing years
either from childbirth itself, or from other causes. These women will not be counted in
a measure like CF or CEB, but would be in TFR or CTFR, at least for part of their
reproductive lives. Whether or not this is an important shortcoming is likely to depend
on what one is trying to model in the ¯rst place. That is, is the goal to try and model the
expected number of children, or the expected number of children conditional on survival
to completion of fertility? If it is the latter, then CF (and CEB) will provide unbiased
estimates of this concept (subject to the proviso about death rates being uncorrelated
with fertility choice).
70E Additional Figures
71Figure A1: CEB based on different Censuses

































































CEB for various ages


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A3 Figure A4 (a): Children ever Born
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Figure A4 (b): Children ever Born
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